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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Tlie purpose and the sources of the ohesis
. The pur-
pose of the ohesia is to consider Kant » s treatment, of the
arguments for God, This ought to oe. done purely scientifi-
cally without any religious or credal interests. My intention
is to give Kant ’ a position as truly as I can without being
influenced by the opinions of others about Kant, He ougnt
to have a chance to plead his own case and nobody should
interrupt him in stating his own position. This does of course
not mean that none should criticise him; but it does mean
that one has no right to make any judgment aoout him unless
one has heard and understood him*
Outside literature aDouo Kant has been purposely
neglected and is only used for illustration, explanation,
or criticism of Kant’s position. Tne main sources of this
thesis are Kant’s own works, the Cassirer edition of which
I used,
Kant ’ s unique influence upon modern thought . Kant ’
s
influence upon the whole of modern thought is unique: His
subjective criticism gave a new path for modern epistemology.
He dealt with the problem of the possibility of a
metaphysic to such an extent and wiuh sucn a skepticism as no
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2other philosopher before nim. Kant»s skeptical treatment
of metaphysics laid the foundation for the common modern
skepticism toward it.
Kant introduced into the moral philosophy the autonomy
of the moral law and the significance of the categorical
imperative for religious life.
He challenged the validity of the traditional theodicy
by rejecting all theoretical arguments for God as inadequate
and by postulating the existence of God merely from the pure
practical reason. In doing this Kant paved the way for the
modern skeptical attitude toward religion which restricts it
to the realm of the irrational
o
Kant*s philosophy of religion is new. He wanted a reli-
gion without revelation and dogmao His new religion was based
upon the moral law* The duty of religion is to realize the
categorical imperative. In making morality the essence of
religion Kant became the pioneer for humanism. The program of
|
this new humanistic religion is ’’human control by human effort
in accordance with human ideals.”
In nis work, Zum ewigen Frieden , Kant laid down the
principles of the League of Nations. He stood for justice and
mutual understanding and rejected the policy of force and
violence. He urged to abandon all secret diplomacy among naticr^®
All the deeds of men should be able to stand the daily sun-
light or should not be done at all®
1 Knuds on, DG, 55.
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aKant 1 s philosophical reflections ere very closely
connected with his epistemology* His whole philosophical sys-
tem stands or falls with it 0 This is especially true about
Kant’s treatment of tne arguments for God. In his own writings
one finds a very close connection between both. It is due to
the inner nature of all arguments for God* All of them are
based upon epistemological presuppositions.
i
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CHAPTER II
KANT’S EPISTEMOLOGY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF HIS TREATMENT OF
THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD
Tine epistemology of Kant as the basis for his arguments
for God . AH arguments for God are based upon the following
three fundamental epistemological presuppositions:
The reality of the Internal and of the external world .
All arguments for God presuppose that it is possible to e3ta-
blish the reality of the internal and of the external world or
of the microcosm and of the macrocosm
. They take furthermore
for granted that reality is not necessarily limited to the
phenomenal world; but that it is metaphysical. The reality of
the internal and of the external world are che foundation whis h
underlie all proofs for the existence of God. If they were not
reality then all our arguments were in vain and full of illu-
sions .
The universal validity of the law of phenomenal causali-
ty
.
The causal argument presupposes a theoretical recognition
of the universal validity of the law of causality. The law of
cause and effect gives us a means to find the last and ulti-
mate cause - - God. It gives sufficient reason to explain the
ultimate grounds of the world if its principles are universal-
ly valid and necessary.
The theoretical possibility of an understanding of the
supersensory . All arguments for God presuppose a theoretical

6possibility for men to obtain some information aoout the meta-
-
physical reality* Without it no argument for God had any
validity whatsoever* The object of all of them is a supersen-
sory Being*
These three presuppositions are predominant in the
Kantian philosophy* All of them had to be established by his
epistemology. It is simply impossible to understand Kant *
s
theology without an understanding of his epistemology*
The philosophic-his tori cal presuppositions for Kant * s
epistemology * These are: the system of innate ideas of Leib-
nitz and Descartes, the empiricism of Locke, and the skepti-
4
clsm of Hume *
1) Lelbnlt zt and Descartes 1 system of innate ideas *
Kant shared with Leibnitz and Descartes the notion of
innate principles or primary notions. But he transcended
them in classifying them. He constructed a threefold schema
which included: innate intuitions, conceptions, aid ideas.
While with Leibnitz and Descartes the innate ideas are a
reflection of the objective reality they are with Kant purely
subjective formations •
!
k ) Locke ’ s empiricism.
Together with Locke Kant limits knowledge to the
phenomenal reality or to the sense-data* The speculative rea-
'
I
son cannot obtain any knowledge of the transcendent reality *
Man’s thought cannot penetrate into the realm of transcendent
reality. • Kant urges that it is impossible to pul? together
!

Gand to unite synthetically appearance and the Ding-an-sich;
because appearance and non-appearance are contradictions*
Standing in accord with Locke Kant denied the objecti-
vity of the conception of substance and cause and of the
so-called secondary or derived sensible qualities, ( colour,
sound, etc.). Locke nold that all sensible qualities are
only in the perceiving suoject end not properly in the tnings
perceived* They are simply signs and not copies of changes
a
which take place in the external world*
b) Hume 1 s skepticism* Just as Hume Kant rejected the
objectivity and t,he universal validity of the law of causali-
ty* Hume finds its origin in habit which leads us to expect
that under similar circumstances one event will be fol3jwed
by an similar one which we have often seen joined with it* He
limits the application of the conception of causality to thosb
cases in which from given facts we c-onclude, according to
analogies of experience, to others* Hume denied the possibilim
ty of our knowing the nature and the mode of the oojective
connection between causes and effects* He also denied the
philosophical legitimacy of our attempting to transcend, by
means of the causal idea, the whole field of experience and
to conclude to the existence of God and tho immortality of
the human soul* Kant 1 s standpoint is very similar to
that of Hume as will be shown later on. But even though
Kant stood under the influence of Hume he did not lo<$se his
2 Erdman, HPE, vol.ii, 79*
3 ttberwegjHPH, vol.ii, lol aeq.
.-
-n.:
.
-
.
'
. a o
t
o
.
• /
,
0 ' •- : ‘ . ,
t
*
c '
<,
.
; J
•" '
—
Ift*
i
7*
originality* Contrary to Hume he dealt with the problem of
causality in connection with the synthetic judgments a
priori*
4) The philosophy of Wolff.
Also Wolff 1 s philosophy influenced Kant considerably,
but more in that what it had in common with Leibnitz and
Descartes than through its own system* Cnristian Wolff adop-
ted the theories of Leibnitz and combined them with ideas
derived particularly from Aristotle* He modified them, and
4
brought them into a system of thought* But his philosophy
was not original like mat of Hume, Leibnitz, and Descartes*
Tne cnaracteris tics of tne Kantian epistemology.
The characteristics of the Kantian epistemology are th
following
:
1) Kent’s notion of sense-perception, representations
>
or intuitions.
a) The limitation of knowledge to sense-experience*
There is a fundamental difference between the- pnenome-
nal reality and tne Ding-an-sich. Tne essence of all things,
the Ding-an-sich, the noumenal reality, is inaccessible to
the human understanding* The noumenal reality is beyond man’s
reach, for man is sense-bound and cannot penetrate into the
realm of the transcendental reality* It is impossible to put
1
together and to unite synthetically appearance and the Ding-
an-sich, because appearance and non-appearance are contradic-
. .
. - tibns *
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The human understanding is limited to the phenomenal
reality and to senso-esfperiences • Kan* 3 perceptions, represen-
tations or intuitions are all sensuous and as such limited to
tho world of sensibility* They deal only with appearances,- but
*
not with the Dlng-an-sich in its noumenal reality* There is
a fundamental dualism between the Ding-an-sich and its appear-
ance as a phenomenon* The things we see are not by themselves
so as we see them, not even is their inner relation so as it
appears to us, for if we would drop the subjective forms of
our sense-intuitibns, then all suojective qualities and rela-
tions of objects would disappear, and even space and time would
vanish* All of them cannot exist as phenomena by themselves,
but they exist only in our human representation of reality*
Consequently it remains completely unknown to us what the
objects are apart from their appearance as phenomena* There is
of course the possibility for our reason to form different
imaginations of the nature of the superworld, but all of tnose
are very problematical*
b) The subjectivity of human experience*
Whenever a thing appears to our senses it is transformed
by subjective principles* Man attributes to them the- sensible
qualities and introduces into them his innate principles of
time and space*
The human mind adds to all phenomena the forms of space
and time and the so-called sensible qualities. Ail corporeal
things appear to ohe human sensibility to have certain
t' 1
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9qualities; but all of these are subjective and conditioned by
tne human mind* Thus for instance color and sound are not
absolute in their character but conditioned by the numan unde:
standing whicn perceives them as such# Kant himself states
5
that
• • • man unbeschadet der wirklichen Existenz Russerer
Dinge von einer Menge ihrer PrRdikate sagen kftnne s sie
gehoreten nicht zu diesen Dingen an sich selbst, sondern
nur zu ihren Ersche inungen, und hRtten ausser unserer
Vorstellung keine eigene Existenz, ist etwas, was schon
lange vor Lockes Zeiten, am meisten aber nach diesen,
allgemein an»enomnien und zugestanden ist* Dahin gehBren
die wRrme, die Parbe
,
der Geschmack etc* Dass ich aber
noch liber diese, aus wichtigen Ursachen, die Ubrigen
QualitRten der Kttrper, die man primarias nennt, die
Ausdehnung, den Ort, und iiberhaupt den Raum, mit allem,
was ihm anhRngig ist, (Undurchdringlichkeit Oder
MaterialitRt, Gestalt etc*) auch mit zi den blossen
Erscheinungen zRhle, dawider kann man nicht den mindesten
Grund der UnzulRssigkeit anftthren, und so wenig, wie der
so die Parben nicht als Eigenschaften, die dem Objekt
an sich selbst, sondern nur dem Sinn des Sehens als
Modifikationen enhRngen, will gelten lassen, darum
ein Idealist heisaen kann: so wenig kann mein Lehrbegriff
idealistisch heissen, bloss deshalb, weil ich finde, das
noch mehr, ja alle Eigenschaften, die die Amschauung
eines Kttrpers ausmachen, bloss a.i seiner Erscheinung
geh&ren; denn die Existenz des Dinges, was erscheint,
wird dadurch nicht wie beim wirklichen Idealism aufgehe-
ben, sondern nur gezeigt, dass wir es, wie es an sich
selbst sei, durch Sinne gar nicht erkennen kttnneno
Space represents the objects of experience as existing
6
side by side or in different places* It is a necessary repre-
sentation a priori forming the very foundation of all exter-
nal intuitions. Without it no external intuition is possiole
for man. It is therefore from the human standpoint alone that
we speak about space, extended objects, etc. Space is nothing
5 Kant: KrV, B, 41.
6 Kant: KrV, B, 40.

10
els© but subjective and formal conditions of our sensibility.
7
Kant himself says:
Der Raum stellet gar keine Bigens chaft irgendeiner
Dinge an sich Oder sie in ihrem Verh&ltnis aufeinander vor,
d.i. keine Bestimmung derselben, die an Gegenst&nden selost
haftete, und welche bliebe, wenn man auch von alien
subjektiven Bedingungen der Anschauung abstrahierte . Denn
weder absolute, noch relative Bestimmungen kBnnen vor dem
Dasein der Dinge, welchen sie zukommen, mithin nicht a
priori angeschaut werden.
Time is another a priori representation which enables
us to understand certain things happening simultaneously or
successively. All intuitions occur in time. We cannot take
away time from phenomena, though we can well take away pheno-
6
mena out of time. Time is consequently given a priori# It
is the subjective condition under which alone intuitions can
take place. Time is the formal condition a priori of all
phenomena whatsoever. Time has objective reality with refe-
rence to phenomena only because these are themselves things
accepted as objects of our human senses. But time is no longer
objective if the sensuous character of our intuitions is
removed^ for time is conditioned by our sense-perception and
becomes real through it.
Let us listen to Kant*s own statements about tne
9
concept of time:
Die Zeit ist kein empirischer Begriff, der irgend von
einer Erfahrung abgezogen worden • 0 • .
Die Zeit ist eine notwendige Vorstellung, die alien
Anschauungen zum-jlrunde liegt • • • • Die Zeit ist a
priori gegeben.
7 Kant, KrV,B, 41,
3 Kant, KrV,B, 49 -50
9 Kant, KrV,B, 4^-47
10 Kant, KrV,B, 40 .
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Die Zeit 1st die formal© Bedingung a priori
aller Erscheinungen iiberhaupt
Kani 1 3 notion of tne categories of thought ,
The human unders tanding transforms the raw material of
our sense-experience and makes thus an articulate experience
possible. This is done by the help of the categories of
thought. These are immanent mental principles constituting
the framework of thought and forming the contents of the
pure reason. They are nothing which can be shown to the sen-
ses, but they are manifested in the mental product. They are
not principles which the mind uses to know with, but the,y
determine the form of knowing. There are various kinds of
categories, e.g. Quantity, Quality, Relation, Modality, etc.
All of them underlie human experience and make it possible.
The human mind would not be mind unless these principles are
la
implied in it. The categories are ’’erworben,” i.e. "aus
den dem Geiste eingepflanzten Gesetzen abstrahiert •" They
are w nicht von den Empfindungen der Sinne abstrahiert , " and
have their source H in der Natur der Seele” as "intellektuale
Vorstellungen.”
Kant 1 s conception of re ason.
The human reason fulfils the task of uniting all the
15
sense-data of experience and bringing them into inner unity.
All© unsere Erkenntnis hebt von den Sinnen an, und
f
eht von da zum Verstande und endigt bei der Vernunft,
ber welche nichts HBheres in uns angefroffen wird, den
11 Kant; KrV, B, 50.
Kant, KrV, B, 50$ Kant an M. Kerz, 21 Febr. 177^
„
io Kant, KrV, B, 055. **
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Stoff der Anschauung zu bearbeiten und unter die h&chste
Einheit de3 Denkens zu bringen.
Reason is able to unite the raw material of our
sensation on account of its innate rational ideas of an "I",
’’World,” and "God." The ”IM contained in reason builds up
its own world. This world of thought is of course subjective
and conditioned by the ”1*" But it transcends the mere world
of phenomena in regarding God as the ultimate ground for the
”1” and for thw existence* of the "World.” Reason is both
rational and practical. It includes the whole of life.
A special task of reason is the formation of the
synthetical judgments a priori. The material for it is taken
from experience as brought together into a synthesis, nut
its form and its universal validity are due solely to the
14
human reason. To these synthetical judgments a priori
belongs the principle of the sufficient reason. Everything
that exists must have a sufficient reason for its existence.
There is a reason behind everything. Very closely connected
with tha t is the principle of causality which Kant puts into
15
the following formulation:
Alles was geschieht (anhebt zu sein), setzt etwas
voraus, worauf es nach einer Regel folgt.
The principle of causality has only validity in the
realm of experience, and even here it is not absolute and
without exceptions but mere description of the observed
regularity of events.
14 Kant, KrV, B, 197.
lb Kant, KrV, B, 256 .
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A criticism of the Kantian epistemology
,
negative and
positive .
Negative . Kant’s epistemology contains a lot of weak
points and even contradictions. He must have felt ths t himself
because he changed his epistemology at various times in
different important points. Even between the time of the first
and the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
( l7dl - 1787 )one can notice such a change of thought. Kant’s
system of epistemology never reached the point where it was
free from contradictions.
But he went never so far as to deny the existence of
the corporeal world, of a spiritual being, and of supersensory
beings. He only claimed that it was impossible to penetr-aL©
rationally or intuitively into the metaphysical reality of
the things.
Fichte saw in Kant an absolute idealist. But this is
no adequate solution of Kant’s attitude. Kant always assumed
the reality of the ”1.” But even for this last assumption
there is but little background in Kant’s epistemology. In
it the 11 1" seems to be just as much a mere subjective fiction
of the human reason. It appears to be nothing mere than a
16
part of the subjective category of modality. That n I n am
"l u seems to be in Kant’s subjective criticism very problema-
i ticalo That this is true seems to be so, but between seeming
to be so and being so there is a fundamental difference.
16 Kant, KrV,B, 105
..
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Consequently we would be justified in saying that it seems
^als ob 1 * we were and seemingly form unique personalities.
This would lead us to Vaihinger’s Als-Qb-Philosophie
.
But even according to this philosophy everything exists
only "als ob.” Even Vaihinger’s book. Die Philosophie des
Als-Ob
, ( 1911 )exists only " als ob * 1 it were in reality, and
his whole philosophy seems only as though it were a philosophy
lb is as clear as the daylight that if the reality of the "I"
is denied the whole philosophy leads in its last consequences
to nihilism. This fatal result of Kant’s philosophy is at the
same time a negative refutation of his whole epistemology.
A system which leads to such deviations from the normal prac-
tical life cannot be real, if we want to uphold the possibili-
ty of knowledge at all.
Positive » The human consciousness is not satisfied
with tn Als -Ob -Philosophie for it strives toward positive
goals. It demands a rebuilding of the Kantian epistemology
and a possible correction of it. such an attempt hast o
include the critical elements of xvant ’ s epistemology and must
start with the suoject building up his own world.
Such a reconstruction of Kant’s epistemology includes
the following factors:
a) Trustworthiness of the human reason.
It has at its basis the presupposition that the human
reason is truthworthy and able to understand one oruoh. This
**
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holds true each time when the human reason understands the
state of things witn full evidence and with necessity*
b) The objectivity of space and time.
Through evidence I am certain that I am and that in me
a number of realities take place* Thus I think, I will, I am
sensitive to pain, etc* Furthermore I am conscious of the fact
that these inner processes are not merely real, but that they
last a certain time and that they extend over a certain space*
My own consciousness is convinced through evidence that space
end time are not mere sensations of my representations or
intuitions© But this guarantees the objectivity of space and
time •
c) The objectivity and the universality of the prir*
ciple of causality©
The same consciousness informs us further about inner
relations whicn exist between some inner processes in us©
Especially it notifies us with ail certainty that some pro-
cesses occur in succession of others* They stand in a relation
of cause and effect to each other© Thus for example our
consciousness observes that the motion of the hand is intended
by tne numan will and caused by it; “and furthermore that the
slowness and quickness, the force or weakness of this motion
depends upon man*s power of volition employed by its production
we are further conscious of the fact that not only the begin-
ning but .also tne ending of an action is caused by the will
determination* These insights lead us to the conclusicn that
.I .... I • .
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the principle cf causality is objectively valid®
Upon further reflexion it becomes evident tnat one lav/
of causality is universally valido Kacn thing and consequently
also every newly arising process must have a sufficient reason
for its existence, rhis sufficient ground could po^ibly lie
within or without tne arising process. But if we consider it
closely we find that the sufficient reason cannot be found
within the limits of the newly aduing process alone® Otherwise
a becoming process would exist as a sufficient ground for it-
self before being actual reality. It would have uo be thought
of as existing oefore it exists which would be a mere contradioj
tion; for there is nothing which can be and not be at the
same time. Consequently it has to lie outside of the process.
Furthermore it must be something existing in order to be the
sufficient reason for the existence of tne originating process.
Only an existence thing can oe tne reason for the existence of
a new thing and thus oe its cause. The reflective conscious-
ness shows us clearly tnat everything tnat oecomes reality
presupposes a sufficient cause. This proves the objectivity
of the principle of causality#
d) Tne existence of the external world.
We are further conscious of certain facts end processes
which come upon us witnout our own doing and without our own
will-determination® For example wnen I enter the room I become
aware of tables, chairs etc., which have different colors,
forms, height, length, breadth, etc® I might now do the best
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I can in denying the reality of those things ana in thinking
them away or in giving them a different colour they actually
have, - - but each time when I open my eyes I have the same
sight end simply cannot nelp seeing tne same form, colour,
etco The reality of those things is reflected in my mind and
give me each time the same perception* For each of these per-
ceptions our reflective consciousness tries to find a suffi-
cient reason for its explanation. But this can be done accor-
ding to tne principle of causality* The cause of them cannot
be f i ound merely in tne "I* which perceives them; but must o©
sought outside of it* Consequently tnere exist outside of
my W I" things which stand in a relation of cause and effect
to my ‘'I.'* This proves the existence of an extra-mental or
external world.
e) The character of the external world*
The human reason affirms only the reality of the
external world* But it do«s not pass any judgments about its
character. It might be spiritual, or corperal, super sensuous
or sensuous. Divine or merely created* Out of this fact it
oecomes at once evident that we might regard the existence
of the supersensory, spiritual or Divine just as much as
standing in a causal relation to us as the existence of the
sensuous and of merely created* It is only from the character
of the causal influences that we can infer the character of
the originator of those causes* The arguments for God ar© oaaed
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on che assumption that the natural world contains evidences
of causes referring to an external being which originated
them.*

CHAPTER III
KANT’S GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ARGUMENTS FOR GOD
Kano
1
s tnree general criticism* of the arguments for
God and an evaluation of them.
Kant’s general attitude toward the arguments
for God is expressed in the following quotation from the
1
Kritik der reinen Vernunft i
Ich behaupte nun, dass alle Versuche eines bloss
spekulativen Gebraucns der Vernunft in Ansehung der Theo-
3^ie glnzlich fruchtlos und ihrer inneren Beschaffenheit
nach null und nichtig sind; dass aber die Prinzipien
Ihres Naturgebrauch.es ganz und gar auf keine Theologie
fiihren, folglich, wenn man nicht moralische Gesetze zum
Grunde legt Oder zum Leitfaden braucnt, es ttberarl keine
Theologie der Vernunft geben kttnne . Denn alle synthetischen
Grunds&tze des Verstandes sind von immanentem Gebraucn,
zu der Erkenntnis eines hbchsten Wesens aber wird ein
trans zendenter Gebrauch derselben erfordert, wozu unser
Verstand garnioht ausgerttstet ist.
The doubts raised by Kant in this quotation are
general and yet the fundamental objections to all arguments
for God. They are found again and again in Kant’s own writings
and might De summarized in the following three paragraphs?
a) Human reason is sense-bound and experience alone
do^s not furnish us sufficient ground for a postulate of the
Divine being.
^
Denn alle synthe tischen Grunds&tze des Verstandes sind
von immanentem Gebrauch, zu denErkenntnis eines hbchsten
Wesens aber wird ein transzendenter Gebrauch derselben
erfordert, wozu unser Verstand garni cht ausgerUsteo ist.
Soli das empirischgliltige Gesetz der Kausalit&t zu dem
Urwesen f&hren, so musste dieses in die Kette der Gegen-
st&nde der Erfahrung mitgehttren; alsdenn w&re es aber, wie
alle h'rscheinungen, selbst wiederum bedingt.
-
1
- -
- 3 , 1..— -=A.
1 Kant, KrV, B, o6b.
2 Kant, KrV, B, 664.

no
To this objection of Kant the following can be offered
as a criticism to Kant’s view; It is of course true tnat our
thinking has oo take its materi al from intuitions or from the
experience of the world in and outside of us • Chie might even
go so far as to say tnat all human thinking is accompanied
by intuitive representations or even oy human phantasies* But
the thinking as such is not a mere seasuous intuition or re-
presentation, but § quite different mental activiuy, through
which alone we understand inner relations and facts which
mere sensuous intuitions or phantastic representations could
never discover because of their mere sensuous character* The
understanding can only reveal those laws because of its intel-
lectual capacities* The laws and facts which are employed
in all arguments for God are of rational nature and made oy
the human reason* All arguments for God stand in a close
connection with the objective reality because they are built
upon facts and laws founded upon reality. Since reason has the
capacity to transcend the raw material of our sense-experience
and to discover universally valid laws, we should be aole to
trust reason whenever it uses those facts in order to infer
from them the Giver of all reality.
b) Krlaubte man aber auch den Sprung fiber die Grenze
der Erfahrung hinaus vermittelst de3 dynamischen Gesetzes
der Beziehung der Wirkungen auf ihre Ursachen, welchen
Begriff kann uns dieses Verfahren verschaffen ?Bei weiten
keinen Begriff von einem hBchsten Wesen, well uns Erfahr-
ung niemals die grttsste aller mftglichen Wirkungen* ( als
welche das Zeugnis von ihrer Ursache ablegen soily, dar-
reichb
b Kant, KrV, B,
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Against this staiemenc of Kant one can hoia to the
opinion thau the laws and facts derived from our sense-data
give us certain keys to the understanding of the ultimate
cause of them. The tnings of nature contain a great number
of laws which give us a ko-y to the under standing of the most
high being as its originator. Those laws are hidden to the
senses, buc are revealed to men b;y che understanding. They
!
give us a sufficient basis for affirming an eternal being.
Though they are by no means complete, they still are a good
beginning to start with,
c) Der Grunasatz, von dem, was geschieht, ( dem
Empirischzuf&lligen)
,
asl \Klirkung auf eine Ursache zu
s chiles sen, ist ein Prinsip der Naturerkenntnis, aber nicho
der spekulativen. Demi wenn man von ihm als einem Grund-
satze, der die Bedingung mttglicher Erfahrung Uoe rhaupt
enthjiit, aostrahiert, und indem man aides Emp iris che
wegl&sst, ihn vcm Zuffllligen ttberhaupt aus-agen will, so
bleibt nicht die nvindeste Rechtfertigung eines solchen
synthe tischen S ; tzes Ubrig, urn daraus zu ersehen, wie
ich von etwas, was da ist, zu etwas davon ganz Verschie-
denem (genanrt Ursache) ttbergehen ktinne
:
ja der Begriff
einer Ursache verliert ebenso, wie des ZufElligen, in sol-
chem bloss spekulativen Gebrauche alle Bedeutung, deren
objektive Realit&t sich in concre to begreiflich maclien
liesse
.
*
All arguments for God rest upon the supposition of
the universal validity of tne law of causality, but this can
only be proved as being valid to the phenomenal realm of
experience. Man cannot prove its transcendental validity and
reality. This common objection of Kant has already been
dealt with in tne previous chapter in connection with his
epistemology.
4 Kant, KrV,B
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A general survey of Kant ’ 3 critical treatment of the
different arguments for God
.
Kant expresses his general oponion about the different
arguments for God in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft
,
where
5
he states:
Es sind nur drei Beweiaarten vom Dasein Gottes aus
spekulativer Vernunft mSglicho A±le Wege die man in die-
ser Absicht einsclagen mag, fangen entv/eder von der be-
stimmten Erfahrung und der dadurch erkannten besonderen
Beschaffenhei t unserer Sinnenwelt an und steigen von inr
nach Gesetzen der KausalitUt bis zur httchsten Ursache
ausser der Welt hinauf; Oder sie legen nur unbestimmte
Erfahrung, d,i, irgend ein Dasein empirisch zum Grunde;
Oder sie abs trahieren endlich von aller Erfahrung und
schliessen g&nzlich a priori aus blossen Begriffen auf
das Dasein einer hbchsten Ursache* Der erst© Beweis ist
der physikotheologische, der zweite der kosmologische,
der dritte der ontologische Beweis, Mehr gibt es ihrer
nicht, und mehr kann es auch nicht geben*
Kant rejects the ontological argument as one based
upon mere empty concepts. He objects to the teleological
argument because it can at best only lead to a wise architect
of the world, but not to an eternal, infinite, and almighty
God, T^e cosmological argument can lead according to Kant
only to a necessary being, but not to its infinity, God’s
infinity cannot be proved, and if it were attempted it would
be nothing else but an analysis of an empty and abstract
concept. The moral argument is one of the practical aspect
of our reason. We assume the reality of God because of one
practical significance of such a belief for the whole of life,
but we do not have a theoretical proof of its validity. The
6 Kant, Krv, B, ©16,
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scientific demonstration of God. is to be denied, out there
is reason enough to assume God’s existence if it can be shown
that the belief in Him is necessary for the practical life of
man. Kant holds that the moral nature of man requires the
existence of God.
Kant’s criticism of the theistic arguments is justified
in many ways, though not in all respects. The whole of his
criticism rests upon his epistemology and really stands or
falls with it.
Kant ’ s personal faitn and its basis .
It is not strange at all that Immanuel Kant devoted
so much of his time and energy to theological questions. His
parents we i e both very pious people and devout members of the
pietistic church in Germany. His father exemplified the vir-
tues of industry and truthfulnes ~ . He was a man of high moral
standard. His chief interest was to make his children hard-
working and upright. But Kant’s mother was far more ardently
and emotionally religious, and se ms to have had a far more
forceful personality than her husband .Her main interest was
to educate her children in the love and in tne fear of God.
She was a woman of natural intelligence and of great genuine
piety.
Kant stood under the influence of pietism, and while
in his home he encountered pietism at its best. Later on in
his scnools he learned from his classmates tne other side of
pietism to which many of his classmates adapted themselves.
*-
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This was a form of hypocrisy. When young and active boys are
expected unanimously and daily to give evidence of great
religious fervour, tney are bound 10 do so wiunout observing
strict proportion to tne emotion actually felt, Kanu 1 s early-
6
acquired honesty saved him from such short-cuts to favor,
Kant was unable to acquire a taste for that affected form of
piety and must have regarded it as a youthful slavery. He
acquired a lasting r abhorrence of all religious emotions and
did not want to have anything to do with tne singing of hymns
and tne saying of prayers for tne rest of his life. After
reaching maturity, he never attended cnurch services; he even
took special pains to avoid them. He rebelled against certain
practices of the Lutheran cnurch, but ne did not turn against
religion altogether. It was probably the memory of his home
and the acquaintance witn men like Schultz and Knutzen tnat
kept alive in nim the relative sanity and justice of his
7
mature estimate of pietism.
An a man of the Enlightenment Kant was a strong advocate
of the right and duty of every man to judge for himself in
religious as well as in secular matters. His motto was, have
8
courage co make use of your own intellect l Consequently ne
subjected religion to tne same criticism as any otner field
or human experience. He reasearcnes in the field of the theo
retical reason led him to the belief that from the empirical
stand-point the existence of God and tne immortality of tne
soul cannot be proved, since both lie completely beyond one
o, Greene, RLR, xxviii sq,
7 fcsulsen, KLD, 26 „
8 Kant to M, Mendelseohn, April 8, lVtw,

range of experience, This would lead, to skepticism. But Kant
had too high an estimate for religion as to deny its unique
influence upon the whole of life. He therefore came to tne
conclusion that although tne theoretical reason cannot demon-
strate its truth, religion has a unique place in life. On the
moral consciousness is founded the absolutely necessary con-
viction of the existence of God as tile ruler of the kingdoms
of reason and nature, who establishes the necessary harmony
demanded by the moral consciousness betweem moral worth and
happiness
.
Kant himself was eoucated and brought up in the pietis-
tic movement in Germany which stood closely related with the
Lutheran church, - - in fact was believed to be a revival
of the spirit of Dr. Martin Luther. The Lutheran church holds
to the belief that God is an almighty and sovereign being
ruling over the world. He is an infinite being and thus stands
to an open contrast with man as a finite being. It was this
belief in the Divine infinitude that caused a let of trouble
to Kant in his arguments for God, for there is no argument
which can prove the Divine infinity. All of them could
possi 'ly lead to a finite God, but not to the God of the tra-
ditional Lutheran church.
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CHAPTER IV
KANT AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD
Kant
1
s treatment of the ontological argument ,
The ontological argument concludes from the conception
of God as a most real being to his existence, since necessary
existence belongs in the clas3 of realities, and is therefore
contained in the conception of the most real being, Kant
here disputes the assumption that being is a real predicate.
According to him the conception of an absolutely necessary
being is a conception of the pure reason. It is a mere idea
of the objective reality which is not proved at all by the
1
fact that reason requires it*
Kant rejects the idea tha^being is a real predicate
by adding which to other predicates the sum of realities
a
may be increased* The comparison says Kant between a oeing
possessing other predicates, but not being and a being combi-
ning wioh these predicates that of being, and hence by so mucn
greater, more perfect, or more real then the f ormer, is absurd.
Whenever a being is affirmed, the object Is posited with all
its predicates. This is the meaning of being. But when a being
is not affirmed - - or, what is exactly the same thing, when
the object is not thus posited - - no conclusion can be drawn
from the conception of the ooject to its predicates*
1 Kant, KrV, B, 6<s0*
2 Kant, KrV, B, 625.
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Kant himself argues:
Der Begriff 1st allemal mttglicjh, wenn er sich nicht
widerspricht
. Das 1st das logische Merkmal der Mflglichkeit,
und dadurch wird seln Gegenstand vom nihil negativum
unterschiedeno Ailein ©r kann nicht sdestoweniger ein leerei
Begriff sein, v;enn die objektive Realitftt der Synthesis,
dadurch der Begriff erzeugt vvird, nicnt be senders dargeuan
wird; welches aber jecerzeit, wie oben gezeigo worden,
auf Prinzipien mflglicher Erfahrung und nicht auf dem
Grundsatze der Analysis (dem Satze des Widerspruch.es
)
beruht. Das 1st ein© Warnung, von der Mfiglichkeit dor
Begriffe (logische) nicht sofort auf die MCglichkeit der
Dinge (reale) zu schliesseno
There is already a contradiction in introducing the
concept of existence into the concept of a thing which we pro-
fess to be thinking solely in reference to its possibility
of existence. We must always ask is this or t-hat thing whose
existence we presume an analytic or a synthetic proposition.
If it is analytic, the assertion of the existence of the
being adds nothing to the thought of the thing. In that case
either the thought in us about it is the thing itself or we
have presupposed an existence as belonging to the realm of
the possible. We would then have inferred its existence from
its internal possibility but tnat is nothing else but tauto-
4
logy.
Kence in reasoning to the existence of God, if being
is to be demonstrated as a predicate, being must already have
been assumed. We arrive consequently only at a pitiful tauto-
logy. This tautological conclusion would be identical, hence
an analytical proposition, but tne assertion that God is, is,
like all existential propositions a synthetical one and conse-
quent ly
3 Kant, KrV, B, ^23, Anmerkungo
4 Kant, KrV, B,
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can only be demonstrated a priori in regard to a noumenon.
All existential propositions are synthetic and their predicate
of existence could be rejected without any contradiction*
Being is no real predicate at all; for it is a concept
of something that could not be added to the concept of a thing.
It is me ely the positing of a thing, or of certain determina-
5
tions as existing in themselves. Logically it Is nothing else
6
but the copula of a judgment.
Der Satz ’Gott ist allm&chtig, * enth&lt zwei Begriffe,
die inre Objekte haben: Gott und Ailmacht; das Wttrtchen
"Ist" ist nicht noch ein PrSdikat obenein, sondern nur das,
was das Pr&dikat be zienungs .-else aufs Suojakt seczt.
Nothing is added to my concept. The content is one and
the same. Th© ”lst" expresses only tberelation of objects 0
Or to express the same thought in different words, the real
7
contains no more than the merely possible
.
Hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das Mindeste
mehr als hundert mttgliche. Denn da diese den Begriff, jene
aber den Gegenstand und dessen Position in sich selbst
bedeuten, so wtlrde, im Fall© dieser mehr enthielte als
jener, mein Begriff nicht den ganzen Gegenstand ausdriicken
und auch nicht dor angemessene Begriff von ihm sein. Aber
in meinem Vermttgenszustande ist mehr bei hundert wirklichen
Talern als ilnei dem blosaen Begriff derselben (d.I. ihrer
Mttglichkeit ) • Denn der Gegenstand ist bei der Wirklichkeit
nicht oloss in meinem Begriffe analytisch enthalten, sondern
kommt zu meinem Begriffe, ( der eine Bestimmung meines
Zustandes ist), synthetisch hinzu, onn© dass auch dieses
Sein ausaerhalo meinem Begriff diese gedachten hundert
Taler selDst im mindestwn vermehrt werden.
ife nt rejects oh© oncological argument for God because
the Idea of a perfect being does not Imply the existence of
that b eing. Mere idea does not involve existence. An imaginary
Kant, KrV,B,
Kant, KrV, B , o
Kent, KrV,B, og7.

or a real hundert
«9
hundert Taler may have all the quaxibio-j n
Taler without oelng real* The idea does juot Involve existence
No single idea carries with it its own proof. There is a
fundamental difference setv/vcn one idea and the reaxioy ox
onao idea*
<J
-‘he ontOxOgical argument ±0x God has no validly, iox
8
from a mere concept ox God Oxi« ‘cannot infer nis wxiotvnce.
Sin Menach mficnte won! eoensowenlg auo oloasen Ideon
an Einsichten reicher werden, &la win Kaufmann an VermBgen,
wenn er, um soinen Zustand za Zeroes sern, aeinem Kaseenoe-
stande einige Nurlan anh&ngen wollte*
A criticism of Kant 1 s treatment of the ontological
argument and a reconstruction of it .
Kant is quite right in rejecting the notion tnat the
idea of a perfect oeing implies its existence. Between idea
and reality there is a gull' which xogie caiuuot overoridge.
The idea of God is one thing and God Himself is another tning*
/J.1 human thoughts are auojective and not even always free fraai
error.
. Reality la something deeper than tnought - - man c@n
noo always understand it in a^l details. There ia some tiling
in reality QVer and aocve the idea or it* It is coxxcretw
and individual* Thexe is a unique element in existence Wnich
transcends human tnought. Reality cannot oe reduced to numan
reason, - - it is something oeyond it*
On the Ooner hand onei-e are certain elements of truth
in the ontoxogical argument a wnich Kant overlooked* It is an
Oho •& Karnz, Kry, B,

OU
expression of our felon in on© reality of tne ideal* Tne
Che
ideal must be^ everlas ting real* Man believes in cne reality
of the ideal and of values in general* The oncological argu-
ment expresses faith in the objectivity of value* u It sketches
&
the supreme hypothesis for thought to test* 11 It is a
faith in tne reality of the ideal whicn dwells in all men
and appears to be a consensus gentium*
Furthermore the ontological argument expresses "our
intellectual desire for completeness in our conceptions* But
10
here we do not begin with an idea separated from reality, 0
and proceed tnen to argue tnac ohis idea must necessarily
include reality* This desire for completeness implies that on©
idea has reality from tne first, bo oh in my own idea and as
based on an apprehension of a reality other than tne idea,
whether of the internal or of in© external world,.
The ontological argument expresses an aspiration of
- perfection* The perfect io oO d© real, and m©n must be aule to
understand it*
Finally it ha* to oe pointed out that there is not
necessarily auen an impa^siole gulf o© tween thu Creator and
one cr©ated* Man is not a mere ©mpoy space; out he has the
capacity to understand things* Even a revelation from God
can only o© preoerved so far a* it io understood oy men*
Professbr Dr* Kroner expressed uno ught in nis lecture
11
so uio seminar in Kant 1 a Relj-giouo. Pnij.Ooop.uy
,
when ue -oa^d
^ ^^ighoman. Outline to PUR, ( ly«^%.—od ) •
1U sorley, MVTG, bio.
11 Minutes from Kant’s PHR, Session xii, January 8,J.yoo
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"The mind can alone be seized if it seizes tnab whicn
seizes it'J.. Philosophical theology has found "that if
tha mind itself is to be solzed by that which it did not
create, iu must have a God that it itself does not create.
This was the reason for the old ontological argument
which claimed that its idea of God v;as not produced, Out
was received •“
. . . ii
*
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CHAPTER V
KANT AND THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD
Kant's treatment of ohe cosmological argument
.
1
Kant writes in the Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
chat the
cosmological argument has the following form:
•
Wenn etwas existiere, so muss ^uch ein schlechterdings-
nfi) twendiges We sen existieren. Nun exist ieren zum mindesten
ich selbsfc; also exisuiert ein aosolutnotwendiges Wesen.
The first part 01 uhis statement contains tne common
fact of experience from which we infer an absolutely necessary
oeing. The cosmological argument is based on the most common
fact of experience. It is onerefore not ontological or a priori.
Since ohe cosmos is ohe ooject of all possible experiences
Kant calls this the cosmological argument for God. The cosmo-
logical argument is dependent upon an indefinite experience
while the conceptual argument stresses the meaning of the
world and its purpose is considered b^ the texeologicai argu-
ment, T&e cosmological argument regards the world as an effect.
It holds -to the notion of causal or dynamical ground of the
world which is finally identified as being God. The unity of
ohe world ground is conditioned by God,
The cosmoxogical argument proceeds then as follows:
The necessary being can be determined in one way only
,
namely,
by one out of each possible pair of opposed predicates. It is
therefore completely determined by its own concept. But there
i Kant
,
KrV, B , do*^ ,

is only one concept, possible which determines a thing complex-
ly a priori. That is Ole concept of ohe ens realise imum. This
concept of tne ens realissimum is consequently che onl^
concept through which a necessary being can be thought. In
id
other words, a supreme being necessarily exists. Kant
v)
holds that
In diesem kosmoloc-ischen /.rgumente kommen so viel
vernlinf telnde Grundsatze zusammen, dass die speculative
Vernunft hier all ihre dialektische Kunst aufgeboten zu
haben scheint, um den grttss tmBglichen transcends ntalen
Schein zu Stande zu bringen.
The speculative reason making use of its dialectical
skill produced in the cosmological argument the greatest
possible transcendental illusion, Kant admits that the cosmo-
4
logical argument is based on experience. Since it makes its
stond on experience it is distinct from the ontological
proof, which puts its entire trust into pure a priori concepts
But the cosmological proof really used experience only in one
single step in the whole argumentation, namely, to conclude
the existence of a necessary being, Kant holds that reason
abandons experience altogether in the latter part of the
argument. Thus the empirical premiss tells us what proper-
ties this postulated being has or may have. But reason is
bold enough to endeavour to discover from mere concepts what
properties an absolutely necessary being must have, T|ie specu-
lative reason finds out which among possiole things contains
in itself the conditions- - requisites - - essential uc
Kant, KrV,B, ou3-o4 •
b Kant, KrV,B,ob4,
4 Kant, KrV,B, ^o4.
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absolute necessity. The cosmological argument holds that
these are nowhere to be found save in the concept of the ens
realissimum . The conclusion is thereiore drawn that the
ens realissi urn is the aosolutely necessary being. Kano
5
points out that it is evident that we are here presupposing
that the concept of the highest reality is completely ade-
quate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence. The
cosmological argument presupposes that the existence of an
ens realissimum can be inferred from our concept thereof.
From mere concepts one can infer the thinkability of some-
th
thing but not the absolute necessity of its existence. If
vj
I say:
Der Begriff des entis realissimi ist ein solcher
Begriff und zwar der einzige, der d'ern notwendigen Dasein
passend und ihm adjiquat ist, so muss ich auch einr&umen,
dass aus ihm das letztere geschlossen werden kfinne • Es
ist also eigentlich nun der ontologische Beweis aus lau-
cer Begriffen, der dem sogenannten^kosmologischen Beweis
alle Beweiskraft enhfilt, und die angeoliche Erfahrung ist
ganz mflssig, vielleicht, um uns nur auf den Begriff der
absoluten Notwendigkeit zu ffljbren, nicnt aber um diese
an einem irgend bestimmten Dinge darzutun.
Kant admits that experience may lead us the the con-
cept of absolute necessity, but he holds that it is unable
to demonstrate this necessity as belonging to any determinate
thing.
In summarizing the cosmological argument and Kant’s
treatment of it one might say that the cosmological argument
concludes from the fact that anything exists to tne existence
of an absolutely necessary Deing, which oeing, by the aid or
5 Kant, KrV, B, -£>5.
b Kant, KrV, B,^oo.
*
...
4 - I
.
.
t
.
1*
*
1
*
v
•
<. .
J **
.
i . •: •
, «. K
•
^
* t
v i
C SJ
che oncological argument, is then identified with G-od as ^he
most real or perfect being ( ens realissimum or perfectiasi-
mum) • Kant, on one contrary denied that the principles which
regulate the use of reason justify us in prolonging the chair
of causes beyond the sphere of experience; but, he adds, if
the argument did really conduct to an extr&mundane and abso-
lutely necessary cause, it would not demonstrate that this
cause is the absolutely perfect being of the traditional
church. Besides that to take refuge to the ontological argu-
ment is shown to be inadmissible by the demonstrated invali-
dity of the latter.
A criticism of Kant » s treatment of the cosmological
argument .
Kant*s treatment of the cosmological argument stands
in contrast t 0 that of the theistic philosophy. This beoomes
evident when we consider the main points of the latter, to
which most of the theistic philosophers would agree:
Men exist at present who could not have inhabited the
inhabited the world eternally. Whence do they come? One could
answer that they descend from father and mother, and the lat-
ter agfeir from their parents etc* Thus we would have an
unbroken chain of human descent. But this chain must have a
beginning. Natural science tells us tnat there was once a
time when no man could have existed because the means to
the maintenance of life were lacking. Consequently there must
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have been a time when human beings began to exist and started
to gain their livelihood. But whence did they come and what
iw the origin of life in general?
There are two different answers possiole. First of
all one could say that life originated from matter. It is
matter entered into existence. Matter is self-sustaining
and existing by itself. Life is a new form of it. But how
could matter transform itself inuo life, if it is dead and
indifferent to the forms of existence? Natural science
informs us that the existing material has its own definite
extension, form, position, and relation to other atoms of
the same matter. If it is in motion it has its own special
form, direction, and intensity in its motions. In other words
atoms occur either in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state of
aggregation and their motion is determined by it. Mere
atoms as such are indifferent and neutral to any state of
aggregation, form, direction, and intensity in their motions.
Atoms cannot exist separately; they must be connected with
others. Matter cannot exist without a definite extension,
form, position in space and without having its own state of
aggregation. A material atom without any form, position etc,
cannot exist. Tnese laws are presuppositions for any kind or
exixtence. Mere matter v.ould be neutral and indifferent and
as such lack the necessary presuppositions for existence. As
wuch it does not contain the cause of existence. There must
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be something else which makes existence possible*
Since life is not contained in pure matter as such,
it must have been originally outside of it* There must have
existed outside of the material world a Deing which sustains
matter and pub life into it* This oeing cannot be mere matter j
for as such it could net contain in itself the ccause of life*
lb must be an eternally spiritual being or an ens ae bermum .
This being must be of eternal duration, for if it were not
such, we could ask the question, from whom did this being
originate and why at this special time and not at any other?
These questions can never be answered and create more diffi-
culties than they solve. We have to accept God ! s existence as
eternal* Ee is an eternal, spiritual, and rational being
who sustains and originated thw world*
The question whether matter exists eternally is whether
it was created in time by this Divine being, ia a very subor-
dinate question far the cosmological argument* It does not
matter at all whether it is a finite or an infinite series
of dependence from the Divine originator, Kant ! s assertion
7
that the cosmologioa.*. argument, infers
von der Unmbglickkeit einer unendlichen Reihe fiber
einander gegebenar Ursachen in der Sinnenwelt auf eine
erste Ursache,
is not quite true*
The cosmological argument is not able to demonstrate
the infinitude of God, but is a sufficient argument for a
finite God*
7 Kant, KrV, B, woo
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CHAPTER VI
KANT AND THE TSLEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD
Kgnt
»
3 attitude toward the teleological argument in
in his pre-critical period .
During his pre-critical period Kant dealt with the
teleological argument in two of his writings. These are the
Allgemeine Nat urges chi chie und Theorie de s Kim, iels
,
which
was published in 1 V«jo and Per eln zig mflgllche Beweisgrund
zu einer Demonstration dcs Daselns Got tes , which appeared in
176o
.
Kant * s treatment of the teleological argument in his
Allgemeine Naturge s chichte und Theorie des Himmels
.
This
work of Kant appeared anonymously. It is dedicated to Frederick
the s§cond. The fundamental philosophical ideq of the work is
the compatibility of a mechanical explanation of nature, which
without arbitrary limitations, seeks in ail cases a natural
cause in place of ocher causes, with a teleology which views
all nature depending on God. He develops in this work his
Yeltbildungs theorie . He asserts that cur solar systems origi-
nated from an eternally old vaporous mass, which began to
shape itself into balls. The collision of the masses caused
the side motions. Our whole planetary system is consequently
the result of the activity of pure mechanistic laws, which
work autonomously without any interference of an external

o9
intelligence, Kant dealt with this question: Does this new
theory contradict the assertion of the Scriptures where God
is the sustainer and creator of the world? The Scriptures
hold that He alone is the the giver and preserver of unity
1
and purpose in the cosmos. Kant himself says:
Wenn icn diesen Vorwurf gegriindet fSnde, so 1st die
ttberzeugung, die icn von der Unfehlbarkeit gCttlicher
Wahrheiten habe, bei mir so vermttgend, dass ich axles,
was ihnen widerspricht, durch siw ftir genugsam widerlegt
halte und verwerfen wttrde
•
Bub he is convinced that his theory stands in harmony
with the Scriptures and the teleogical argument for God. He
2.
says
:
Die Materie, die der Urstoff aller Dinge ist, isb also
an gewisse Gestze gebunden, welchen sie frei 6toerlassen,
notwendig schttne Verbindungen hervorbringen muss, Sie
hat keine Freiheib, von diesem Plane der Vollkommenheit
abzuweichen. Da sie also einer hBchst weisen Absicat
sich unterworfen befindeb, so muss sie notwendig in solcne
ilboreinstimmende Verh&ltnisse durcn eine iiber sie herr-
sciiende Ursache versetzt werden sein, und es 5.3 L ein GOoo,
eben ddswegen, weil die Natur auch sich im Chaos nicht
anders als regelm&ssig und ordentlich verfabren kann.
That the forces of nature themselves work intelligent-
ly, bears witness to the existence of an intelligent author
of nature. Matter is subject to certain laws. Nature working
in harmony with laws brings forth combinations of oaauty. Bub
this very fact compels to assume the existence of God, For
how were it possible that things of vafious natures in
combination with each other should strive to effect such
exquisite accords and beauties, unless they owed a common
origin in an infinite mind, in which the essential qualities
1 Kant, NTH, I, 222.
2 Kant, NTH, I, 22d .
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of all things were wisely planed?
Der eine Schluss 1st ganz richtig; wenn in der Verias-
sung der Welt Ordnung und Schttnheit hervorleuchten, so
ist ein Gott. Allsin der andere isc nicht weniger gegriin-
det: wenn diese Ordnung aus allgemeinen Naturgesetzen
hat hervorfliessen kttrmen, so ist die ganze Natur not wen-
dig eine Wirkung der hfichsten Weisheib*
If the inner nature of things were determined by an
intrinsic necessity independently of each other, they would
not, as a result of their natural tendencies, adjust themself
to each other, exactly as a reflecting, prudent choice would
combine them* since God works through nature there is harmony,
The toleo logical as "Per einzig mtipliche Beweisgrund zu
einer Demonstration des Daseins Got tes
Eight years later Kant devotee a whole book to the
teleological proof for God’s existence. He called it: Der
einkL g mflgliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseirs
Got tes . It was published in ±7o5. The only possible proof
for the existence of God is for Kant the teleological* There
is an other possibility to prove the existence of God and that
is by miracles, but this is only for those people who are
unable to do profound thinking and simply believe what is
told them to have occurred. Miracles are possiole, i.e. thin-
kable, out we do not have information enough about tnem, to
regard them as a definite proof for the existence of God.
The argument from the order and the purpose in nature is of
entirely different character. It presupposes an insight and
5 Kant, NTH, I, o4^.
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a deep understanding of the laws of nature. If one considers
the intrinsic laws of nature one cannot help inferring from then
*
i
the existence of a ’wise being that made and sustains them.
Die grosse Einheit in einem so weitl&ufigen Ganzen
l&ssb abnehmen, dass nur ein einziger Urheber aller die-
ser Dinge sei, und wenngleich in alien diesen Sohlttssen
k^ine geometrische Strenge hervorblickt, so enthalten sie
doch unsbrittig so viel Nachdruck, dass sie einen je^en
Vernttnftigen nach Regeln, die die natttrlich© gesunde
Vernunft befolgt,keinen Augestolick hierllber im Zweifel
lasaen.
The laws of nature are universally valid and necessary
They are the a prior presuppositions for the harmony and order
in the universe. It is very easy to infer from them a unitary
5
being as their source. Kant himself states that,
/im iaehrsten enthttlt die Methods, fiber die vollkommenen
Anstalten der Natur zu urteilen, den Geisc wharer Welt-
weisheit, wenn sie jeaerzeit bereit, auch iibernatttrliche
Begebenheiten zuzulass^n, imgleichen die warhaftig kttnst-
lichen Anordnungen der Natur nicht zu verkennen, haupt-
s&chlich die Abzielung auf Vorteile u^d alls Wohlgereimt-
heit, sich nicnt hindern l$sst, die Grttnde dav&n in not-
wendigen, allgemeinen Gesetzen aufzusuchen, mit grosser
Achtsamkeit auf die Erhaltung der Einheit und mit einer
vernttnftigen Abneigung, die Zahl der Naturursachen um
deretwillen zu vervielfSltigen. Wenn hierzu nocn die
Aufmerksamkeit auf die allgemeinen Regeln gefttgt wird,
welchen den Grund der notwendigeu Verbindung desjenigen,
was natttrlicherweise ohne besondere Anstalt vorgeht, mit
den Regeln des Vorteils oder der Annehmlichkeit vernttnf-
tiger Wesen kBnnen begreiflich machen und man alsdann
zu dem gBttlichen Urheber hinaufsteigt, so erfttllt die
physischteloologische Art zu urteilen ihre pflicht gehBrig.
Kant holds it possible to arrive at a proof of God
by venturing on the dark ocean of metaphysics, whereas sub-
sequently he undertook to demonstrate the impossibility of a
theoretical proof for the existence of God. Already in tnis
Kant, BDG, 1q8 .
Kant, BDG, 144.
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work Kano lays down ode doctrine, that the existence is no
predicate or specific attribute of anything. Through the fact
of existence things do not receive another preuicate in
addition to those predicates which they have without existence
as things simply possible. Ir± the conception of any logical
subject, noj ufc predicates cl possibility are even found.
The existence of a thing is an absolutely positing of the
thing, and is therefore distinguished from all predicates,
which as such are never positea otherwise than relatively
to some things. It is impossible that nothing should exist;
for then the material and the data for ail that is possible
would be removed, end hence all possibility would be nega-
tived; but that by which all possibility is destroyed is
absolutely impossible. This argumentation of Kant is nothing
else but a mere paralogism. The assertion of the absence of
ail possibility of existence is, indeed, identical with the
assertion of the impossibility of existence, but not with
the assertion of the impossibility of the supposed absence
of all possibility, Kant continues his argumentation in
concluding that there must exist southing in an absolutely
manner. -This necessary being is one, because it contains
i
the ultimate real ground or reason of all other possible
beings. Hence every other thing must depend upon it. It is
simple, not compounded of numerous substances, lb is the
eternity of the uniV' rsal cause under the same form. But
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already in this work Kant expresses the belief that chose
precious convictions which are most necessary for cur happi-
ness are not st the mercy of subtle reasonings, but are given
directly to the natural vulgar ur.der standing* At aha close
of the Dock, Per einzfe mOrliche Bewei sgrund zu einer Demon-
s traticn des Daseins Gottes ,Kant states,
Es ist durchaus ntttig, dass m^n sich vom Dasein Gottes
flberzemge; es ist aber nicht ebenso ntttig, dass man es
demons trie re
•
Kant ' s attitude toward the teleological argument du-
ring his critical period « Kant's attitude toward ohe cosmo-
logical argument for God changed completely under thy influ-
ence of his newly devoloped epistemology. The first as well
as the second edition of his Kritik der reinen Vernunf
t
giv/e
plenty of illustrations for it. But there is no difference of
opinion between those two ecitions regarding the teleological
proof of God's existence. Tp
x
e Kritik der reinen Ve rnunf
t
appearec first in the year lVtsl marking a new epoch in the
life of Immanuel Kant.
In the Kritik der reinen Ve rnunft Kant no longer attempts
to conceive the intuitions of space and of time as phenomenal
correlates of the Divine omnipresence and eternity; but consi-
ders them as absolutely and only subjective forms. He was
forced to do this step because in the same work he treated
the ideas of relation, the comr.iercium of substance and the
idea of substance as merely subjective and consequently could
t Kant, BDG, 1753
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no 2/ongr find In then on objective bonis for the subjective
intuiuion3 for space and ti o, neither could ho find in the
eternity of the universal oauoo tho objective basis of tho
subjective intuition of ti e. This was especially impossible
for him, since he now viewed the absolute as loaat cf ell
things scientifically know* >lo.
Tho teleological argument concludes ^ron tho order
and adaptation in nature to the a sol to wisdom and power
of its author. Kent spook3 of this argument oven in his criti-
cal with respect, on account of its ofilcecy in producing:
7
convict ns, but ho denies its scientific validity.
Die sor levels vordient jeo rsalt mifc /chtunr rononnt
a. tr 1st der £ltesfce, kl to, und der
i 'non honschenvcrnunft 1 m moisten angeaossene. Kr
bolebt das Stud-Ium d r Katur, sc wie er solbst von diosom
sein Df 30ln hat und d&durch loner ncue Kraft bekommt.
Er bring! 2woeke und nbsichten dahin, bo slo uiaere
bocbachtung nicht von aoblst entdockt h&tfco, u a orweitort
urisero Haturken-tnis durch don Loitfadon c inor uesomde-
ron Einholt, deron Prinalp aU3-er der hafcur 1st. Dieuo
Konrtnisse -Irken aber wio or auf ihro Uraacho, nihalich
die ver; nla3 aendo Idee
,
zurftek, und vormehren den Glue son
an olnon httchoton Urheber bio eu einor unwiderstohlichen
0 jerEougunr.
The conception of finality ecu, ? ccerdlng to Kant,
no more than tho concept 1 n of cause, be employed in justifi-
cation of conclusions which lead us beyond al- the li:it3
of the world of phenomena! for it too is of egoistic or sub-
jective cririn, end la, lie the conception of cause, trans-
ferred by nan from hi 3^If to things, ut it is invalid as
np lied to transcendental objects. Kant hi self states that
±
7 Kant, KrV, B, 651-52.
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Die Physikotheologie kanr uns doch nichts von einem
Endzwecke der Schbpfung erCffnen, denn sie reicht nicnt
einmal bis zur Frage nacJi demselben. Sie kann also zwar
dem Begriff einer verstSndigen Weltursache als einem
subjektiv fiir die Beschaffenheit unseres Erkenntnisver-
mbgens ailein tauglichen Begriff von der MSglickkeit der
Dinge, die wir uns nach Zwecken verst&ndlich machen klinnei*
rechtfertigen, aber aiesen Begriff weder ip theoretischer
noch praktischer Absicht welter bestimmen. 0
In the same paragraph Kaxiu summarizes his position
9
and makes the following statement:
Wir kttnnen also wohl sagen • • • nach der Beschaffen-
heit und den Prinzip&en unseres Erkenntnis vermSgens, die
Natur in ihren uns bekannt gewordenen zweckm&ssigen Anord-
nungen nicht anderes als das Produkt eines Verstandes,
dem diese untereorfen ist denken kttnnen: ob aber dieser
Verstand mit dem Ganzen derselben und dessen Eervorbrin-
gung noch eine Endabsicht gehabt haben mttge (die alsdann
nicht in der Natur der Sinnenwelt liegen wtir e ) , das kann
uns die theoretische Naturforschung nie erttffnen.
Did, however, the teleological argument lead to an
extramundane author of the world, it would only prove the
existence of a world-builder of great power and wisdom, accor-
ding to the degree of adaptation manifest in the world, but no
to an almighty and all-wise creator of the world. And here,
again, to supplement the argument by having recourse to the
ontological argument would be unjustifiable.
Kant’s objections to the teleological argument and a
criticism of them. Although Kant had a very high estimate for
this argument, he doubted its validity. He raised five
objections against it:
The physico- theological argument is one of mere analo-
gy • As suca it cannot give apodictic certainty. He has nothing
6 Kant
,
Kj» *d# Urt.,IX,5t>.
9 K®nt, Kr.d. Urt.,II,55.
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to object to the rationality and utility or this argument. IK
fact he comriiends it. But he rejects the claims of apodictic
certainty which this argument advances* Kant holds to the view
that it cannot hurt the good cause, if tne dogmatic language
of the overweeming scphist be tcned down to a more moderate
i
and humble requirements of a belief adequate to quieten our
lu
doubts, though not command unconditional submission. He
11
himself says:
^ |!
Ohne hier mit der natttrlichen Vernunft tlber ihren
Schluss zu schikanieren, da sie aus der Analogie einiger
Naturprodukte mit demjenigen, was menschh che Kunst her-
vorbringt, wenn sie der Natur Gewalt tut und sie ntttigt,
nicht nach ihren Zwecken zu verfahren, sondern sich in
die unsrigen zu schmiegen, ( der jihnlichkeit derselben
mit H&ussern, Schiffen, ,Uhren ), schliesst, es werde eben
eine solche KausalitSt, nfimlich Verstand und Wills, bei
ihr zum Grunde liegen, wenn sie die innere M6glichkeit
der freiwirkenden Natur, ( di~ alle Kunst und vierleicnt
selbst sogar die Vernunft zuerst mttglich macnt), xiocn
von einer anderen, obgleich flbermenschlichen Kunst aoleioec,
welche Schlussart vielleicht die sch&rf&te transzendentale
!
Kritik nicht aushalten dttrfte, muss man doch gestehen,
dass, wenn wir einmal eine Ursache nennen sollen, wir hicr
nicht sicherer als nach der Analogie mit dergleichen
zweckmSssigen Erzeugungen, die die einzigen sind, wovon
uns die Ursachen und Wirkungen vflllig bekannt sind,
verfahren kflnnen. Die Vernunft vfirde es oei sich selbst
nicht verantworten kOnnen, wenn sie von der Kausalit&t,
die sie kennt, an dunkeln und unerweialicnen Erkl&rungs-
grfinden, die sie nicht k«nnt, (ibergenen woj-lte.
Against this oojection to Kant the following answer
can be given* It is of course possible to use analogy in
connection with the teleological argument* But tne human ex-
perience telss us without exception that a complicated order,
design and aim in the natural order of things, cannot be
constructed by anything else than ^ .an intelligence » This
10 Kant, Krv, B, .
11 Kant, KrV, B, >£>«

4 ?'
is the univers&l experience of all men and admits of no excep-
tions. It is of course thinkable that ay an incidental, olind,
and none-intelligent activity a simple formation can be crea-
ted. But the more complicated the order becomes, and the more
different factors have to be interwoven with some material
thing in order to complete its structure, the more improbable
does it become for a blind and none-intelligent cause to oe
the ultimate ground of all existence » If one considers tne
harmony, order and design of the universe tne possibility for
a blind chance is very weak. Kant who always urged us to
remiin on the ground of experience should have had a better
understanding for the analogies of the teleological proof
for all of them tre based upon tne facts of experience.
On the other nand it is also possible to have a teleo-
logical proof of the existence of God without the help of
ana. ogles. The pure speculative reason tells us that order,
design, and purpose are the ingenerated products of an
Intelligence. If the activity of free intelligence has any
peculiar qualities of its own over against the motion of
matter, ifi is the unequalled capacity to produce tne most
complicated and yet harmonious order with has a unitary aim,
design, and goalo Wherever a complicated order shows a
unitary purpose, design, and aim, it is a manifestation of
a free intelligence at work.
The teleological argument can only lead zo anhft_g.ee
of the world but not to an infinite God. Kant expresses this

48
i thought In the following quotation:
Nacn diesem Scnlusse mttsste die ZweckmHssigkeit und
Wonlgereimheic so vieler Naturanstaluen bloss die ZufSllig4
koit der Form, aber nicht die Materiw d.i. dee Substanz in
der Welt beweisen; denn zu dem ietzteren wflrde nocn erfor-
dert werden, dass bewiesen werden kfinnte, die Dinge der
Welt wfiren an sich selbst zu dergleichen Ordnung und Ein-
stimmung nach allgemeinen Gestzen untauglioh, wenn sio
niaht, selbst ihrer Substanz nach, das Produkt einer
hfichsten Weisheit w&ren: wozu aber ganz andere Beweia-
grttnde als die von der Analogic mit menschlicher Kunst
erfordert warden ..lirden. Der Bewei3 kfinnte also hftchstens
einen Welibaumeister, der durcn die Tauglichkeic des
Stoffes, den er bearbeitet, immer sehr eingeschr&nkt wMre,
aber nicht einen Welt schCpfer, dessen Idee alles unterv»Oi-
fen ist, dartun, welches zu der grossen Absicht, die man
vor Augen hat, mfimlicn ein ailgenugsames Urwesen zu be-
weisen, bei weitem nicht hinreichend ist. Wollten wir die
ZufBilligkelt der Materie selbst beweisen, so mflssten wir
zu einem transcendent alen Argumente unsere Zuflucht nehmen,
welches aber hier eben hat vermieden werden sollen®
I
Kant’s objection is quite justified if made against
the ordinary form of the teleoxogical argument . The common form
of this proof Is limited to the notion that the final causes
of all things imply the existence of God as their author. But
once could very easily elaborate this argument. Thus for
ex ample natural science Lexis us that the order, design, and
aim in innate in natural things. Tney do not merely adhere to
them, but they grew together with matter and became united
with It through growth. A-l 1 matter is penetrated by design
and without a purpose there exist no material things. From tnisi
fact wo can infer that the intelligent being which is the
ulitmate cause of the harmony and the order in the world is
the creator of the w hole of the subotance of all things. He
i
Kant, Krv, B, un.
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is xxot only architect, but also creator of the world. For tho
one who created matter and sustains it created it with purpose
which is intrinsic in matter.
Even a wise architect is not necessarily an Infinite
-Lo
being
«
Kfent formulates this objection as follows:
Der Schlussgehet also von der in der Welt so durch-
gflngig zu oeobachtenden Ordnung und Zweckm&ssigkeit als
einer durchaua zuffilligen Einrichtung auf das Dasein einei
ihr proportionierten Ursacne. Der Begriff dieser Ursache
aber muss uns etwas ganz Bestimmtes von ihr zu erkennen
geben, und er kann also keixx anderer sein als der von ei-
nem Wesen, das aile Macht
,
Y/eisheit, etc., mit einem
Worte alle Voilkommexihei t als ein allgenugsames Weserx
besitzt. Denn die PrSdikate von sehr grosser, von er-
staunlicher, von unermesslicher &g.cht und Treffric^kei
t
geben gar keinen bestimmten Begriff und sagen eigentlicn
nicnb, was das Ding an sich selbst sei, scndern sind nur
Vernlltnisvers tellungen von der Grttsse des Gegexis tandes,
den der Beobachter (der Welt) mit sicn selbst u: d seiner
Fassungskraf t vergleicnt, und sie gleich hochpreisend
ausfalien, man mag den Gegens tand vergrflssern Oder das
das beobachtende Suojekt in Verh&ltxxis auf ihn kleiner
machen. Wo es an GrSsse (der Voxlkommenheit ) eines Dinges
flbrrhaupt ankommt, da gibt es keinen oestimmten Begrilf
als hen, so die ganze mbglicne Vollkommenheit begreift,
und nur das Ail (omnitudo) der RealitSt ist im Begriffe
durchgingig bstimm.t.
Kant had the notion that, God must necessarily be an
infinite and omnipotent o elng in order to God at all. He shared
this oelief witn that of his tine, which did not know anything
at all about a Finite God.
Tne idea of a finite God has been developed in its most
original and profoundest form by Dr. Brightman. It introduces
a dualistic principle into the framework of a monistic
philosophy. Dr. Brightman holds to a li itation inherent in
lb Kant, KrV, B,wOw»
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the Divine Nature. Against the Given or Retarding element
the Divine will is struggling. Tne idea of struggle within
God’s nature is a new idea in tne history of personalistic
and idealistic philosophy. But God is not only limited by
His own nature. He is also limited by the laws of reason. God
could not be irrational and unreasonable and still be God.
As a rational being God has the capacity to think, but if a
person thinks he is in some sense limited by that thought,
for his thinking must remain within the sphere of a system.
A system is a limitation of man ! s aroitrariness and demands
14
obedience to its rules. The laws of logic which God has to
obey in order to be consistent limit his own rationality.
Kano is therefore quite right when he asserts that a
wise architect of the universe is not necessarily an infinite
being with infinite wisdom. Every being has to be conditioned
in order to fit into the whole system of nature. Beings must
obey the laws of nature as well as the laws of logic. The time
in which Kant lived was not familiar with the notion of a
finite God, - - the Lutheran and Catholic Church knew only of
an Almighty Father. But Kant is quite right that tne teleologi-
cal argument can only lead to a finite being with finite
wisdom. The will of God confronts factors within the divine
consciousness which are dysteleological, eternal, neither
created nor approved by the Divine will, and which necessarily
enter into every act of the Divine will. Natural evil contains
14 McConnell, IGL, IV
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elements which are valueless and without any purpose. Bug
these elements are under the control of God’s good wij.1. God
is limited by factors capable of rational and morel control.
This is the basis for our hope in an eternal progress of the
universe and ali that belongs to it.
As in an evolutionary process ever new and higher
standards of living are developed so also God’s perfection is
a growing one. His power and control are increasing and His
work is expanding. The thought of God as a union of form and
15
content makes it necessary for us to face the question:
Was there a time when there was nothing but pure matter
or content, that is, when all r s Given? Has God developed
from a formless beginning toward a condition which
eventually be pure form?
If this question were to be affirmed, then God would ue
a mere temporal and transient phase of an eternal universe.
He could not be the ultimate source of all beings. But these
questions may be answered negatively; for if we suppose that
Id
God is eternally both matter and form,
then from eternity to eternity the divine reason is
unchangingly rational, yet also from eternity to eternity
the divine has the Given as a stimulus to activity L.nd
as a source of problems to solve.
There is then no decisive argument which could lead us
the belief that the Given involves either a beginning or
an ending of the divine activity.
lo Brightman, PG, I9u.
lw Brightman, PG, 190.
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The close connection b etv.e n the teleolcr leal , the J30S-
mological a lid, the ontological argument <> The teleological argu-
ment if thought through in all details leads to the cosmologi-
cal and ontological argument. But both of which are invalid
because they are a proof of mere words derived from some human
subjective concepts. The teleological argument can indeed lead
us to the point of admiring the greatness, wisdom, and power
of the autnor of the world. But here it stops and can take us
no further. We then have to abend on the argument from tne
empirical basis, and fall back upon the contingency which we
infer from the order and purposiveness of the world. With this
contingency as the sole premiss the teleological argument
advances by the aid of transcendental concepts only to the
existence of an absolutely necessary being. It ventures then
to make a final step. It jumps from the concept of the abso-
lute necessity of the first cause to tne completely determina©
or determinable concept of that necessary being which is the
all-embracing reality. Thus the teleological argument failing
in its own undertaking has in face of this difficulty suddenly
fallen back upon the cosmological proof* But tne latter is
according to Kant nothing else Out a disguised ontological
proof. It has really achieved its purpose by pure reason alone;
although at the outset it denied all kinship with pure reason
and professed to establish its conclusions on convincing
17
evidence derived from experience alone.
I 1 * Kant, KrV, B, ubv
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If one would scrutinise the procedure of the teieolo-
i!
jjgicai argument one would find that after advancing some con-
-
siderable way on the solid ground of experience and nature,
one finds onself just as far distant as ever from the object
which discloses itself to one’s reason. Since experience alone
does not help to come to ohe ultimate ground of all beings
one has to leave it and to pass over into tne realm of mere
possibilities. Here the investigator has to hope upon the wings
of ideas to draw near to the object - - the object that had
refused itself to all of one’s empirical inquiries. After uhis
tremendous leap, when for the teleological argument firm ground
seems to have been found, one has oo extend one’s concept o^er
the whole sphere of creation. Thougn the teleological argument
does not give any information of how one comes to the possesyin
18
of the determinate concept it is applied to the whole universe
The ideal which this reasoning thus involves is entirely a
product of pure reason and has been confused throughout tho
whole argument as originating from experience. Kant himself
19
summarizes it as follows:
So liegt demnach dem physikotheoiogischen Beweise der
kosmologische, diesem aber der ontologische Beweis vom
Dasein eines einigen TJrwesens aid hftchsten Wesens zu Grun-
de, und da ausser die sen dreien Wegen keiner mehr der
spekulativen Vernunft offen 1st, so 1st der ontologische
Beweis aus lauter reinen Vernunftbegriffen der einzig
mOgliche, wenn ttbera-Ll nur ein Beweis von einem so weit
tiber alien empirischen Verstandesgobrauch erhabenen Satze
mttglich 1st*
The following criticism has to be passed on Kant’s
objection to the teleological argument in this form* He is
18 Kant, KrV* B, 8o7o
19 Kant, Krv, B, 858,
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right in asserting that che ontolor ical argument is a proof
21
of mere concepts. Prof. Dr. Bowne says.
The ontological argument in its most common form rests
on the notion of the perfect being. .The idea of che perfect
necessarily includes the idea of existence, and would be
a contradiction without it. Hence it has been concluded
that the perfect exisus. There is not a shadow of cogency
in this reasoning. It only points out that the idea of tne
perfect must include the idea of existence; buc there is
noching to show that the self-consistent idea represents
an objective reality.
The idea of a perfect being is thought of as implying
the existence of that being. But it does not take into account
the fact thac a mere idea canr.oc prove ics reality • no single
idea carries its own proof with it. There is a fundamental
difference becween the mere idea of a reality and tne reality
itself. Idea as sucn does not mvolve existence. Kant is
therefore nuite right in rejecting this traditional form of the
ontological argument#
But he is net right in asserting that the teleological
argument is based on the cosmological. Botn proofs are based
upon entirely different facts. The cosmological argument deals
with the fact of the new rise and tne passing away of parts
of the whole world systems, while the teleological argument
deals with the facts of tne design ana the purposiveness pre-
vailing in nature o Bouh proofs come to entirely different re-
sults, The cosmological argument leads to the belief in the
existence cf an external oeing
,
of ; n ens a se about whose
character we know nothing save that he is the ultimate world
ground. The teleological argument results in the belief of a
21 Bowne, T, 4Y.
22 Lotze, M, II, ^vu
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creative, external being full of wisdom and design and purposive
ness. The cosmological argument exalts the fullness of God’s
existence as an ens a. sej while uhe teleological argument
emphasizes the free and creative activity of the v/ise world
architect and finally points to God as cue Creator. This diffe-
rence is not merely verbal, but it is rooted deep in the reali-
ty of our human experience.
The teleological argument rests upon mere subjective
categories of thought
.
Kant finally holds that the teleological
argument is nothing more than a mere hypothesis built upon
purely subjective concepts and ideas; for it rests upon subjec-
tive categories of thought 0 These are, purpose, unity, and the
idea of a world and cf a God.
The teleological argument holds that the highest formal
unity is the purposive unity of things. It comes to uhis con-
clusion by the aid of the speculative reason; though it does not
want co acknowledge it. It regards all the order in the world
as if ic had originated in the purposiveness of a supreme rea-
son. Such a principle applied to che field of experience opens
up entirely new views as to how the things of the world may oe
connected according to teleological laws. Thus it enables us
to construct a new unity of the world in accordance with our
25
own teleological interests. Kant says:
Die Voraussetzung einer obersten Intelligenz, als der
alleinigen Ursache des Weltganzen, aber freilich bloss in
der Idee, kann also jederzeit der Vernunft nutzen und dabei
doch niemals schaden.
23 Kant, KrV, B, tlo
.
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The assumption of the existence of God does not ham
reason because it gives a systematic unity to the world, out
it is nothing else but a mere hypo cht> sis which can be used
as long as it does not create contradictions*
Denn wenn wir in Ansehung der Figur der Erde ( der
runden, doch etwas abgeplatteten ), der Gebirge und Eeere
etc. lauter weise Absichten eines Urhebers zum voraus
nnehmen, so kttnnen auf diesem Wege eine llenge von Eifclek-
kungen machen* Bleiben wir nun bei dieser tforaussetzung
als einem bloss regulativen Frinzip, so kann selbst der
Irrtum uns nichts schaden# Denn es eoenfalls daraus
nichts weiteres folgen, als dass, v.o wir einen teleologi-
schen Zusammenhang (nexus effectivus) angetroffen uerde,
v.odurch wir in einem solchen Falle nur eine Einheit mehr
vermissen, aber nicht die Vernunfteinheit in ihrem empi-
rischen Gebrauche verderben.
The error of our assumption cannot do us an serious harm.
The worst that can happen is chat we are^ disappointed in our
expected teleological connection and we find mere mechanical
or physical laws at work. Even a disappointment of this kind
25
cannot effect the teleological law in its general bearing.
Denn obzwar ein Zergliederer des Irrtums tlberftthrc
werden kann, wenn er irgend ein Gliedmass eines tierischen
K&rpers auf einen Sweck oezient, von welchem man deutlicn
zeigen kann, dass er daraus nicnt erfolge, so ist es docn
gftnzlich unmftglioh, in einem Falle zu beweisen, dass eine
Natureinrichtung, es mag sein welche es wolle, ganz und
gar keinen Zweck habe
.
The assumption that there is a unitary being which
gave unity and purpose is a regulative principle of reason. It
aids us in securing the highest possible systematic unity
by means of the idea of uhe purposive causality of the supreme
cause of the world. We regard it "as if" this oeing acts
W o24 Kant, KrV, B, /lb-l
25 Kant, KrV, B, Vlu.
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Iin accordance with a wise purpose and "as if” it were the
c$use of all things
.
Against this statement of Kant the following criticisms
can be made. Kant’s arguments are the outcome of his epistemo-
logy, in which the concepts of order, purpose, purpcsiveness
,
and aim are mere subjective categories of thought. The idea
of world and of God are subjective ideas of reason. Everything
which transcends the phenomenal real is only "as if" it were
real.
In the chapter on Kant’s epistemology I showed that
Kant’s view stands in contrast to the perceptions and judgments
of the human consciousness and that ohey lead either to a
solipsism or to an epistemological skepticism. But that v/ould
mean the denial of all knowledge and the self-surrendering
of reason. But every normal human being holds that it can
understand trutn. The teleological argument leads us thus
back to the main problem of epistemology: Is science and with!
truth possible to oe understood by the human mind or not? If
the answer has to be negative,
,
then nfo argument for God is
possible at all. They are nothing more but a mere pity of
words. Whosoever follows Kant in his epistemology must finally
also deny the possibility of natural science and of truth etc*
For according to Kant unity, order, purposiveness and aim in
nature - - the very basical facts to which natural science
holds, - - ail of them are rendered by the Kantian epistemo-
logy only "as if" they were real.

CHAPTER VII
KANT’S MORAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD
The theoretical proofs of
.
the existence of God are
the so-called oncological, cosmological, and teleological or
physico-theological arguments. Kane denied all of thse theor^-
tical arguments ultimate validity. Tne idea of God like all
cne other transcendental conceptions of reason, has theoreti-
cal vality only in so far as it, as a regulative principle,
serves to lead the understanding in all empirical cognition
to seek for systematic unity. AI-l transcendental ideas are
not constitutive principles through which certain objects
lying beyond the reach of experience may oe known. They merely
help to form a systematic unitj and completeness in all the
comprehensions of oar understanding made in the field of
experience# We are required oy a correct maxim of natural
philosophy to abstain from all theological and from all trans-
cendent expalanation of the arrangement of nature generally.
But in the employment of the practical reason the ideal of the
reason of God may serve as a form of though for the highest
object of moral and religious faith. God is a postulate of the
1
pure practical reason. Under a postulate Kant understands
einen theore tischen, als solchen aber nicht erweisbaren
Satz sofern er einem a priori unbedingt gelten-
den praktischen Gesetz unzertrennlich anh .ngt
.
Kant tries to prove tnis assertion in a long argumenta-
tion. He shows first that the immortality of tne human soul
1 Kant, KrV, B, lo5.
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is a postulate of tne pure practical reason, and he concludes
then that also the existence of God and all the qualities
attributed to Him are postulates of the pure practical reason*
It is my intention to follow Kant's own argumentation, though
critically, in order to get a clear underscanding of the exact
position he takes. Later on I shall pass some criticism on his
argumentation, and finally I shall attempt to reconstruct all
whgit is helpful and good in his argumentations formulating new
arguments out of them.
The postulate of immortality of the human soul.
Kant »
s
treatment of the postulate of immortality . The
realization. of the aummum bonum in tne world is the object
of the moral will or of the pure practical reason. Under the
term the summum bonum Kant understands, the union of virtue
and happiness. It is to oe thougnt of as the object of tne
individual desire; for morality is not a doctrine of human
i happiness. It is not the demand for happiness but the moral
law that moves the wirl to strive toward the highest good. All
actions which really shall have some moral value must have
their origin in the moral law quite apart from any considera-
tion of results. The moral law presupposes a moral order
and the possibility for its realization. If tne moral order
were for ever unattainable pure morality would oe iupossiule
at all. The realization of the union of virtue and happiness
in a moral order is the ooject or final goal of all moral
*.
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But tnere is a conflict between the demand for cna
summurn bonum as the necessary object of the pure practical
reason or moral will and mie fact that even by the most
punctilious observance of the floral law in tne world we cannot
expect any necessary connection of happiness with virtue,
adequate to the summurn bonum . Kant solves this problem by
reference to man as noumenon . Man is ooth a phenomenal and
a noumenaj reality. Tne human being exists as a noumenon
in the world of the understanding. It is only in this intelli-
gible world that the ultimate connection between virtue o.nd
happiness can be attained* The possibility of the realization
of the summurn bonum depends upon the immortality of the moral
personality. If man were not immortal he could never reach
the state of holiness or the perfect accordance of tne will
a
with tne moral law. No rational oeing of the sensible world
is capaole at any moment of his existence to have his mind and
action in perfect harmony with the moral law. Nevertheless
since it is required as practical necessary it can only be
p
w
found in a progress in infinitum toward that perfect accordance^
It Is therefore practical necessary to assume tne reality of
sucn a progress in infinitum and to postulate the immortality
of the human soul as its fundamental condition. The endless
progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless
duration of the existence of the personality of the individual
£ Kant, KpV, .
^ Kant, KpV, .
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being which we call the immortality of the soul. Kant esta-
blishes thus the oojective validity of tne belief in immorta-
lity of the human soul on the basis of man’s hope and nis
necessity to realize the highest good. Since the sensiDle
world cannot offer complete olissfulness as reward of virtue
man has t o wait for it and to hope for a future world o Only
in the endlessness of his duration which God alone can survey
can man become holy and biing his will wholly in accordance
4
with the moral law.
A criticism of Kant ’ s treatment of the postulate of
immortality
.
Kant’s argumentation is net satisfactory
fer the following reasons:
1) It does not give any definite information abouo
the time when oho union of virtue and happiness as the highest
goal of men can be attaineu. Kant seems to move it way oack
into an infinite and never fully attainable distance, javen in
the noumenal replm tne human soul still has to struggle in
order to come into fuller possession of the sommum bonum
. The
human wirl never comes to rest; for it is impossiole to uecome
aosolutel^ perfect and thu . tc end io» own pel lection, nut
modern psychology shows that it is necessary for us to know
that it is possible to be morally good and to obtain the
union of virtue and happiness without which man cannot be
satisfied. Kant’s argumentation takes away some of tne Denefi-
cial incentives to strive toward the achievement of the good;
4 Kant, KpV,
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i u cannot be at Gained fully inspite of afl our human efforts
as phenomenal as we-Ll as noumenal beings. Tv
x
Q summum oonum
can never be attained wholly and thus man can never be fully
satisfied,,
&) The postulates and the Ding-an-sich . Kant gave
morality a metapnysical basis o The moral subject, is totally
different from nis sensuous appearance in the world of expe-
rience, As such he stands above space and time and cannot oe
thought of by means of the categories. Kant always emphasized
that space and time are only to be used in connection with
the aorld of appearances as a necessary form of intuiti n. But
his theory of the progress in infinitum presupposes the con-
cep .ion of space and of time and is thus suojected to the
conditions of them. But this contradicts Kant’s position in
the transcendental aesthetic, where he emphasized that the
rational will cannot be tnought of a progressive, itself
developing, or changing., Perhaps I should do best to give
5
Kant ’ s own words
:
Dieses handelnde Subjekt wflrde nun nach seinem intelii-
gibelen Charakter unter keinen Zeitbedingungen stehen,
denn die Zeit ist nur die Bedingung der Erscheinung, nicnt
aber der Dinge an sich selbst. In ihm wttrae keine Handlung
entstehen Oder vergehen, mihin wttrde es auch nicht dem
G-esetze aller Zeitbestimmp.ngen, alles Verenderlichen
urterworfen sein: dass alles, was geschieht, in den Er-
scheinungen ( des vorigen Zustandes ) seine Ursache
antreffe
.
o) Furthermore the soul must be in the noumenal
realm in a steady auxiety and sorrow; for it might be that it
would change its mind and thus' loso the summum foonum for ever.
Kant, KrV, B, 4*^5
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It is possible that the soul changes her character in tne
noumenal world for she is not aosolutely good anyhow and
needs improvements. Thus the noumenal world becomes a place
of anxiety and agony of fear. It really is not a place of
happiness at all but one full of sorrows,
4) Not only the desire for happiness but also the
human longing for a life of the highest moral standing cannot
be satisfied in the noumenal world. Man is always striving
and never reaches perfection* His morality must necessarily
be incomplete -- it must be improvable. But the human soul
really does not strive toward such a patchwork and could not
be satisfied with it. At least in the noumenal real we should
be aole to accept completeness and De happy with it«
6 ) The highest good is on the ground of transcenden-
tal idealism an impossible idea. J^st as impossible as it is
to put together and to unite synthetically appearance a^d
the Ding-an-sich
,
the empirical man on the one side and the
moral man on the other side, because appearance and non-appea-
rance are contradictions, so it is impossible to bring into
unity the sensuous desires of the empirical man and the
character of the summum bonum.
u) Finally it has to be pointed out that Kant * s ar-
gumentation for the postulate of the immortality of the human
soul stands in a clear contrast to the epistemological prin-
ciples as laid down in th^ Kritlk der reinen Yernunft
.
„ -
e
(*
'
\
-
V _i
.
*
.
. _
*
—
•
# -
• J :
- (0 1
• «
,
- -
-
-
.
-
:
1
--'I.. .
.
— -
Ob
Immortality is only a postulate of the practical reason. It
holds to be true because of its practical significance for the
whole of life, but there is no rational proof for its truth
in the whole argumentation. The postulate of the immortality
is based entirely upon our volitional and not upon our specu-
lative nature. The humsn mind wnich wanted to obtain a ratio-
nal insight into the whole problem is disappointed; for Kant
claims there Is no rational proof for the postulate of
immortality besides the one of our volitional nature, Gniuhat basi
it has to be postulated on account of its practical signifi-
cance for the whole of life.
The existence of God as the postulate of the pure
practical reason . The existence of God is postulated by Kant
as the necessary condition for the existence of the sumcium
bonum in the intelligible world. The sumruum bonum Is possible
only on the supposition of God as the highest cause of nature.
He must have a causality which corresponds to the moral
character. He must be an intelligent being for every one
who is capable of acting in accordance with the idea of law
and order must be an Intelligent b©ing. The causality of such
a being is his will. Consequently, God, as - he supreme cause
of nature, inasmuch as he must be presupposed as a condition
of the suminum bonum is a being that, through his own intelli-
gence and will, is the ultimate cause of the world, and as
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such its autnor, From the reality of the highest original
good, i.e. the existence of God the highest derived good or
the jpest possible world is derived,,
Also ist die oberste Ursache der Natur, sofern sie
zum hbchsten Gute vorausgeset zt werden muss, ein Wesen,
das durch Verstand und Willen die Ursache (folglich der
Urheber) der Natur ist, d.i. Gott • Folglich ist das Postu-
lat der Mbglichkeit des hbchsten abgeleiteten Guts ( der
besten Welt ) zugleicn das F0 stulat der Wirklichkeit eineshbchsten ursprttnglichen Guts, nbmlich der Fxistenz Gottea.
Nun war es Pflicht fllr uns das hbchste Gut zu befbrdern,
mithin nicht allein Befugnis, sondern auch mit der pflicht
als Bediirfnis verbundene Notwendigkelt, die Mbglichkeit
des hbchsten Gutes vorauszusetzen, welches, da es nur
unter der Bedingung des Daseins Gottes st&ttfindet, die
Voraussetzung desselben mit der pflicht unzertrennlieh
verbindet, d.i. es ist moralisch notwendig, das Dasein
Gottes anzunehmen.
It is man»s duty to promote the summuni bonum. It is
consequently not merely legitimate but it is of necessity
connected with duty as a need that we should assume the possi-
bility of this summum bonum
. But since this is possible only
under the condition of the existence of God, it inseparably
connects this assumption with duty. Therefore it is morally
necessary and required to assume the existence of God.
The practical reason regards the ultimate union of
virtue and happiness as necessary. Man is bound to seek to
further this harmony or the highest good. It is the inaispen-
sible condition for the realization of the highest good. Hence
we must postulate the existence of a causal reality which by
its own intelligence and will, will be able to effectuate
the exact agreement of happiness with morality. In other words
we must postulate the existence of God.
o Kant, KpV, lbu.
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The practical reason is of course not able to trans-
cend the empirical conditions and to attain a knowlectge of
Goa, No knowledge of God is possible for the theoretical
or speculative reason# Kant himself states in his Vorworte
to pie Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunf
t
,
criticizing the demand for theoretical knowledge of God:
uo
Alle Menschen kbnnten hie ran auch genug haben, wenn
sie ( wie sie sollten) sicn bloss an die Vorschrift der
reinen Vernunft im Gesetze hiel^en. Was brauchen sie aucn
den Ausgang ihres moralischen Tuns und Lassens zu wissen,
den der Weltlauf herbeifiihren wird? Ftir sie ist’s genug,
dass sie ihre Pflicht tun, es mag nun auch mit dem irdi-
schen Leben alles aus sein und vohl gar selbst mit diesem,
Gltickseligkeit und Wilrdigkeit vielleicht niemals zusammen-
trefi'en. Nun ist T s aber eine von den unvermeidlichen
Einschr&nkungen des Menschen und seines (vielleicht
auch aller anderen Weltwesen) praktischen Vernunftvermb-
gens, sich bei alien Hsndlungen nach dem Erfolg aus den-
se lben umzusehen.
Nor must we presume to use the conception of God for
the purpose of deducing the moral laws; for it was from, the
inherent practical necessity of those very laws that we were
led to the hypothesis of an independent cause or of a wise
6
ruler of the world. Kant himself states:
Die Moral, sofern sie auf den Begriffe des Menschen
als eines freien, eben darurn aber sich selbst durch seine
Vernunft unbedingte Gesetze bindenden wesens gegriindet
ist, bedarf weder der Idee eines anderen Wesens dber ihm,
urn seine pflicht zu erkennen, noch einer anderen frieb-
feder als des Gesetzes selbst, um sie zu beobachten#
Wenigstens ist es seine eigene schuld, wenn sich ein sol-
ches Bediirfnis an ihm vorfindet, dem alsdann auch durch
nichts anderes abgeholfen warden kann; well, was nicht
aus ihm selbst und seiner Freiheit entspringt, keinen
Ersatz ffir den Mangel seiner Moralit&t abgiebt. - - Sie
bedarf also zum Behuf ihrer selbst (sowohl objective, was
das Wollen, als suojektive, was des Kbnnen oetrifft)
keineswegs der Religion, sondern, vermbge der reinen
praktischen Vernunft, ist sich selbst genug.
7 Kant, RGV, Vcrwort, iii-iv
8 Kant, RGV, Vorwort, iii*iv
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Consequently if religious leaders claim that the idea
of a lawgiver is an essential condition for a moral life they
)
show nothing else but tneir own lack of inner morality* The
moral law is eternally given in the structure of reason and is
not created by any arbitrary will 0
According to Kant the question: What may I hope leads
to the assumption of the absolute reality of the existence of
the most high being. Kant comes to this asserticn on account
of his previous assumption that something is which can determine
the last possible purpose, because something has to come to pass
,
9
Perhaps it is good to express it with Kant’s own words:
A-Lles Hoffen geht auf Gldckseligkeit und ist in Absichb
auf das Praktische und das Sittengesetz eben das3eloe, was
das Wissen und das Naturgesetz in Ansehung der theoretiscrm
Erkenntnis der Dinge ist. Jenes l&ngt zuletzt auf den Schlusis
hinaus, das etwas sei ( was den letzten mttglichen Zweck
bestimmt) weil etwas geschehen soul; dieses das etwas sei
( was als o’oerste Ursache wirkt ), well etwas geschieht.
Glttckseligkeit ist die Befriedigung aller unserer Nei-
gungen ( sowohl extensive, der Mannigf ltigkeit derseiben,
als intensive, dem Grade, und auch protensive, der Dauer
nach.
Happiness, of course, is not the motive of our actions,
but to become worthy of happiness may be and shall be the motive
of our actions and will-determinations. Mere happiness would be
a material end and would be as such contrary to the concept
of morality. It would also be a priori or universally valid
and necessary. Consequently the categorical i -perative can take
lu
the following form:
9 Kant, KrV, B, vlo ;RGV, wU.
lU Kant, KrV, B, wlV*
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Tue das, wodurch du wflrdig wirst, glflckselig zu sein.
Tile transition to the idea of a supreme oeing Kant made
very hesitatingly. The only moral motive, he had maintained,
is respect for the moral law itself, and this feeling of
reverence is directed to the object on the seme ground* One
respects always persons and not things. But the respect we
show to persons is properly speaking a respect to the moral
11
law which the conduct of the person exhibits, God. Himself
is holy because in Him the will and the moral law coincide*
The moral law owes its validity not to an arbitrary act of
the volition on the part of God, but to its own moral contents.
The existence of God is not postulated as the basis for moral
obligation; for the moral autonomy gives to every person his
own free choice without any compulsions* Men are not forced
to do the right, - - that would be itself not right and immoral*
Holiness or the union of virtue and happiness is an
end in itself. It is the summum bonum which is granted to men
by God. This God must be omniscient for he has to examine men’s
hearts and to determine the presence or the absence of moral
standard in them* He has also to find out the kind and the
degree of morality present in them in order to be aole to
reward them justly*
This God must also be omnipotent; for he has to. distri-
bute happiness to men the amount of which exceeds the produc-
tivity of all natural beings.
11 Kant, KrV, B, 617
England, KCG, 179.
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God must also be eternal; for he has to grant an eter-
nal happiness which He could not do unless He enjoyed it
Himself*
This God must finally be full of kindliness and goodness
for He has the good will to make men eternally happy*
criticism of Kant * s treatment of the postulate of
God * Kant*s argumentations contain a lot of right points;
and yet his theory seems to have to be denied •
general criticism of the postulate of God 1 s existence
.
The following reasons can be brought forth against
Kant*s theory;
1) Kant himself ascribes to his argument only practi-
cal value and denies its conclusiveness to the theoretical
12
reason. He himself says:
Zur Pflicht gehttro hier nur die Bearbeicung S^r Hervor-
bringung und BefiJrderung des httchsten Guts in der V/e-lfc,
dessen M&glichkeit also postuliert v;e rden kann, die aber
unsere Vernunft nicht andeis denkbar finds t, als unter
Voraussetzung einer htichsten Intelligenz, deren Dasein
anzunehmen also mit dem Bewustein unserer Pflicht verbun-
den ist, obzwar diese Annehmung selbst filr die theoretiscb
Vernunft gehbrt, in Ansehung deren allein sie, als Erklfi-
rungsgrund betrachtet, Hypothese, in Beziehung aber auf
die VerstUndlichkeit eines uns doch durcbs moralische
Gesetz aufgegebenen Objekts (des httchstens Guts), $iithin
eines Bedtirfnisses in praktischer ^bsicht, Glaube und zwar
reiner Vernunftglaube heissen kann, weil bloss reine
Vernunft (sowohl inrem th^oretischen ak praktischen
Gebrauche nach ) die Quelle ist, daraus er entspringt.
But this does not sound like the certainty the human
mind seeks in questions concerning such important matters.
Kant*s position is based upon doubt and the uncertainty of it
12 Kant, KpV, 15o.
-1
»
' £ > . .
r
0
.
.
:
.
'
-
41
i ci
.
.
«
* i
l
t -
t
.
•;
•
'e
i\
.
° (
c<t
does not satisfy the human understanding. The theoretical
does not know anything at all about Gofl. God is unknown and
unknowable for the speculative reason. But the practical
reason assumes God's existence because the moral nature of
men needs Him. Consequently one and the same reason being
applied to different fields of experience on the one hand
accepts God as known and knowable and on the other hand
denies his knowabilit^ . This does nou seem to be correct.
In order to demonstrate the close connection of morality
with religion Kanu had to give up his earlier position, and
to be inconsistent throughout his writings.
d) The moral law of Kant has to be rejected because
of his own epistemology. The whole field of morality is based
upon the pure practical reason. But all that the practical
reason is able to produce is postulates, i .e . truths which
the pure theoretical reason can only feel or anticipate, but
not demonstrate or scientifically warrant. They are not to
be accepted as rationally proved. Tnus the freedom of the
will, the immortality of the human soul, and the existence or
God are merely subjective ideas. All of these concepts cannot
be rationally proved but have to be accepted as true because
of their great practical significance for the whole of life.
It seems so very strange that Kant in his last writings has
to consider the practical necessities of life when he exclu-
ded them all completely in his critical period. At that time
thw moral law was completely separated from any connection
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with the necessities of practical life and. consequently a
mere formula.
0) The motivations of the moral action in man are
according to the Kantian philosophy not quite clear. He de-
mands men to be good for the sake of goodness or for the sake
of the moral law expressing the good will of men. The good
ought to be done for its own sake, just because it is the
good and ought to be obeyed as such. Christianity agrees with
Kant, but finds in the self-denying or self-less love of Cod
as the highest good a much better formulation. Also Christia-
nity rejects mere selfish actions as morally wrong, - - it is
only in connection with God as the highest good that we strive
toward moral ideals and act in harmony with the moral law
.
Thus men are not good for the sake of morality alone; but
because they want to cooperate with God in the increase and
conservation of values. Men obey God because they find in
Him the highest possible good.
4) Furthermore God really does not have any reason
for rewarding men with the summuni bonum in the noumenal
world, for men did not obey any divine commandments but fol-
lowed merely tjbe categorical i operative, which is based upon
man's own moral nature. Kant founded morality upon the
lo
priori principles of cne practical reason.
Also drttckt das moralische Geseuz nichts anderes aus
els die Autonomie der reinen pr&ktischen Vernu-.ft, a.i.
der Freiheit. . . .
In dt»r Unabh&ngiglffsit . . . von aller Materie des
Gesetzes ( n&mlich einem begehrten Objekte) und zugleich
doch Bestimmung der Willkflr durch die blosse allgemeine
lo Kant, KpV, I, o, comp, a ini .
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gese tzgebende Perm, deren eine Maxim© f&hig sein muss,
besfceht das allgemeine Prinzip der Sittlichkeic
.
Autonomy is the "Kigenschaf t des '.Villens, sicn seloo
14
ein Gesetz zu sein. u The ooe< ience of the moral law is done
for the sake of morality alone without any consideration of
God. Kant himself holds to the position that to consider
anything but the moral law would be heteronomous and would
lo
thus deny the autonomy of the categorical imperative. And
yet, though men do not care for God, He is expected to reward
them for their own doings. God shall give to them happiness
although He was never taken into consideration by them. Kant
philosophy implies the thought that God shall reward all hu-
manists etc., who rationally denied Eis own existence, out
followed tne moral law. This does not seem to be sound.
o) Besides that according to Kant 1 s ..'.oral pPiilosopiiy
God is not even necessary for the human happiness. Mon doe&
not need God for the exercise of morality. He is neither tne
lawgiver nor is He the motive of man’s moral action. Men act
virtually by tndr own vigor and strength. The summum oonum
is the union of virtue and happiness and it is inseparably
councCi-eu with tne transcendental realm. Consequently tne
attainment of the summum bonum depends upon men themselves
and not upon God. Men gain it themselves autonomously
•
o) Furthermore it has to be said that the role ascrib^.
bo God by Kent is very unworthy of Him. He is pictured as the
14 Kant, GMS ,11, ob.
lo Kant, GMS, II, V<fco

bringer of happiness without any inner relation to the moral
law, virtue, and the holiness of character, which he is sup-
posed to reward# Kant reduces God to a mere bringer of plea-
sure without manifesting Himself as the Holy One, On the
other hand if God has no connection with the moral law why
should He reward men with happiness and should be interested
in men's virtue? The virtue is according to Kant conditioner
by men's own work and labour and is the result of it, - then
why should He |ae interested in it? This points to another
of the main objections to the Kantian morax philosophy:
4
7) Kant's categorical imperative has to be rejected
because of its autonomous character, Kant holds it to be
universally true and valid. But from whom doe3 the categori-
cal imperative get these characteristics ? - - Obviously not
from men. There is only one person adequate to give those
characteristic qualities and that is God Himself. Therfore
God Himself can be the only originator of the moral law, Kant
is right in so far as the human reason is the revealer of
this law, but he is wrong in asserting that it originated
in men's own thoughts without any divine help. T^e human
concience is the immediate guardian of the moral law, but
even it is conditioned by God from whom it got its standards
of judging and testing. The human reason alone is not the last
ground find norm of the morel law, - - otherwise the moral
law were too subjective and could not be soreign but were
subjected to errors and mistakes of human thinking. Only God
0»
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is able to render the mcr; 1 law free fiom mistakes and to
make it absolutely necegsary for the whole life and universal
ly valid.
A criticism of the postulates of the Divine attributes .
Also Kant's postulates of the Divine attributes are not
satisfactory. Kant objected to the teleological argument that
this' proof would lead merely to a wise architect of the world,
but not to an infinite God. The order and the purposiveness
in nature is limited and cannot lead to an infinite cause of
them. But in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunf
t
Kant changes
his former standpoint and adopts his old notion of an omnipo-
tent and infinite God as needed for the practical life.
But this argumentation is not quite consistent. For
also the happiness that God is supposed to grant to men is
f
limited and conditioned. It is consequently not necessary at
all for God to be infinite in order to give men happiness.
A finite happiness can be produced by a finite feeing and an
infinite being could not even be expected to do something
unfinished and incompletely in its form, A being of finite
power amd wisdom could reward finitely. Consequently the postu-
lates of the Divine infinitude, omnipotence, etc. are out of
harmony with Kant's own system.
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CHAPTER VIII
A RECONSTRUCTION OF KANT 1 S EVALUATIONAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD
I shall try to combine all that seems to me valuable
in Kant's moral argument in order to reconstruct the whole
argument in a more adequate form.
Deep in the human nature there are t ow fundamental
human desires: the desire for happiness and the desire of
morality. Both are inseparably connected in human life.
Everybody working hard to become a better man should be
rewarded for it both here on earth as well as in the trans-
cendental realm of existence. This means he ought to obtain
happiness. It is God's duty to grant to every moral man
this happiness. Thus the natural desire for morality and
happiness in men point toward the transcendental reality or
to the existence of God, 3.0th tendencies of our nature can be
used as the basis for two separated though very related argu-
ments for the existence of God. We could name them the
deontological and the eudaemological argument
•
The deontological argument for God .
Our human soul is immediately conscious of certain moraL
obligations in us. These are of fundamental importance. Thus
for example there is in us the principle, do the good and avoid
the evil, keep order, respect you neighbour's property, etc.
These morel obligations have the following characteristics;
»<.
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They are universally valid and respected by the human reason.
All of them are based upon the speculative reason, which
is common to all normal people. Whosoever does not confront
to them is commonly regarded as being foolish and abnormal.
All of these principles are regarded as being just and our
normal understanding tells us that it is unjust to violate
these inner principles. They play a great importance in our
human life and nearly dominate it. Of course, every man has
the physical power to neglect these principles, - out every
transgression against them is conceived of by the I as being
wrong. Having done wrong the self feels compunctions and re-
morse, He is an nscious of the fact that he has done wrong* ,
The question arises whence are these inner moral prin-
ciples? What are the underlying groMnds for them? TpQ answer
ill be that they are not merely subjective; for if they were
we could get rid of them without the least feeling of guilt
and discomfort. But that is not the case. The inner xroice of
the conscience is not silent, but informs us about what is
right and what is wrong*
One cannot explain away these facts by a reference
to early education and training etc, be it given by parents
or by professors. For we ..ould not accept those principles
from them if they did not appear as true to our own rational
nature. A child does not blindly believe, - but on the contra-
ry makes its own inquiries and adopts only what appears to
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true and real. If education were something merely trained
it would be very easily lost and man would not feel it severe-
ly. But our reason does not allow such a moral freedom toward
those inner morel principles, - - they simply have to be
obeyed.
The sufficient; reason for these inner moral principles
can also not be found in the customs and traditions of our
environment, which we would consciously or unconsciously
have adopted. For if those inner moral principles were nothing
else but merely socially determined mental attitudes then
it would be very easy to get rid of them without any feeling
of remorse and compunction. .But that is simply impossible.
It is of course true that society influences us, but even this
were impossible unless I were willing to be influenced by it
understanding the whole situation. Only if I understand some-
thing as right I am willing to be influenced by it and to
adopt it.
There are of course differences among nations about
some details of these morel principles, but generally one is
entitled to say that all normal men are conscious of the
same fundamental really moral principles. All men feel the
necessity to follow the inward monitor of one’s soul in order
to have a pure and free conscience and not a sense of guilt.
It is only in the practical use of these principles that men
differ and make mistakes. Here manifests itself the uncertain-
ty of reason, the power of passion, the weakness of the will,
.*
•
*
.
-
.
• >- J
V - -
'
80
the influence of education, of customs and traditions, heredi-
ty and so on. But inspite of these influences and even contraj
ry bO them the moral sense of our reason points out what man
ought to do and what not*
The moral law within us is a fact separated from any
human arbitrariness. It must have been Implanted in man by a
being superior to himself* This must be a superhuman or orshsj
cendental being* It can only have originated from what is
understood to oe God. The moral law Implies a lawgiver who
Implanted it In men and made it universally valid and necesssij^
It is experienced by men as an innate human principle*
God must be a finite oeing according to the priniciple
that the effect corresponds to the cause. The moral world is
not infinite and witnout mistakes, out it is a world stri-
ving toward ever higher and better standards of living and
stands thus in harmony with the great evolutionary process.
The eudaemological argument for God
,
Under eudeamonism I understand Gltickseligkeit slehre .
This argument has the task to give a better form for Kant*s
stress on tne idea of happiness, from which he postulated
the immortality of the human soul, the existence of God, and
even the- Divine attributes*
The desire for happiness is deeply anchored in the
human soul. That this is true Is the experience of everybody
day after day* This longing for happiness may be characterized

til
as follows:
It is a natural impulse with us to attain a time-
transcending, never ending, and unlimited happiness. Every
man wants to be happy not only for one day but for ever and
he fights against the causes of unhappiness . Man demands
an eternal unlimited happiness that fulfils all the wishes
and that does rot leave one request ungranted.
This desire for hap, iness is naturally present in all
normal human beings. It is innate in every man, and as such
a part of tin, normal equipment of every men. Even the man who
commits suicide stands under this ban of the desire for
happiness . .He takes his life but for the one reason that he
did not find the happiness in life he desired. He finishes
his life in order to escape from all the sorrows and disap-
pointments that ne had to experience in place of the wanted
happiness
.
The natural desire for happiness is a fundamental
desire for every normal being. This becomes evident if one
considers that it is not only the desire for bodily well-being
but .that it coxisists mostly in the desire for mental and
spiritual well-being or happiness. Happiness is' the fulfil-
ment of all the human dreams end hopes for the future.
Out of all this it becomes evident that in a harmonious
universe this desire must be satisfied, - - otherwise there
would be no sense in having it. The whole nature shows us
that there is no desire as fundamental as happiness that is

left unsatisfied. Nature has given to all of our desires,
satisfaction and this within the limits of possible reach.
Thus for instance when a plant thirsts for rain or sunshine
nature makes it possible that each one of these desires c$.n
be fullfiiled. It is obvious that the human being cannot
be excluded from this fundamental principle of nature. This
especially not since man is the crown of the whole creation,
in whom order, purposiveness and design ought to find their
highest expression. If with him the most outstanding desires
would remain unsatisfied then the crown of the whole creation
would be in discord with the rest of nature. But that would
be contrary to the principle of unity and harmony prevailing
in hature. Consequently the human desire for happiness and
perfection must be satisfied as any other human desire. Man
must finally be in possession of an eternal and unlimited
happiness
.
This can become only possible if God exists; for He
alone can provide for an unlimited happiness and guarantee
its eternal duration. Besides that the highest happiness
toward which men are striving is after all nothing else
but the oneness or the close communion with God; for men
strive toward an existing happiness and not to a shadow of
reality without any inner life. Men want to possess unmea-
surable existing happiness. It does not need to be infinite
for that might be too much for the human soul and body .But
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it should be a happiness great enough to transcend all the
limits of earthly things. Such a happiness can only be found
in and through God, for God is the unmeasurable highest good.
Thus from the desire of happiness as it is contained in the
human soul the existence of God as th® highest good can
be inferred with certainty.
--
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CHiiPTER IX
SUMMARY
The two last considered new arguments i‘or God show us
God in a beautiful light • The deontological argument shows
us God as the just and powerful personality. He is the author
of the moral law and is manifested in the conscience of every
men* The eudaemo logical argument shows us God as the highest
possible good toward which man is striving, and never finds
rest unless he rests in Him.
From both we can learn that the desire for morality
and happiness are no contrasts but that both are very closely
connected* Whosoever by faithful performance of his duty be-
comes a morally good man and thus satisfies his desire for
morality, attains at the same time in connection with it the
satisfaction for his desire for happiness, for one and the
same God is the guarantee for both.
Morality has of course more importance than being a
bringer of happiness. It is universally necessary and valid
for every personality. If a person does not follow it he will
also lose the satisfaction of his desire for happiness. One
and the same God is the guarantee for both of it; for as the
giver of them moral law and the highest good he connects
morality with happiness and immorality with misery.
Kant treatment of the moral argument obtained thus
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a correctiorio The valuable elements of Kant's treatment of
tills argument were retained and elaborated; but the rest
left out.
Kant dehiea the possibility of any rational proof
of the existence of God based upon the speculative reason.
We form the idea of an empirical whole, of a whole of expe-
rience, and we conceive this system of objects, this universe
of things, or phenomena, as something existing apart fi om us.
Men forget that it is their own idea, and thus make an enti-
ty of it. Men preserfc it as an individual thing, as the highest
reality, all-sufficient, eternal, and simple. This is done
by all theology in its proof for the existence of God. The
ideal of transcendental theology is God. He is the ideal of
all existence, but the ideal of the most real being is a mere
idea. Man cannot get any knowledge whatsoever from the
transcendental reality. Men are sense-bound and have to oe
satisfied with the sense-data.
There are three proofs for the existence of God, the
tereological, the cosmological, and the ontological, all of
them are worthless according to Kant.
To take the ontological argument: The conception of
a being that contains all reality does not imply existence.
Existence does not follow from the notion of the most real
being. Here man spins out of an entirely arbitrary idea
the existence of an object correspondent to it 0
In the cosmological proof, man concludes fro®, thy idea
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of all possible experience (world or cosmos) the existence
of a necegg ary being. God alone can be conceived as such a
being. We have no roght, however* to conclude that because
we think there must be an absolutely perfect and necessary
being, such a being exists. This is really the ontological
prodf over again. Moreover, the argument concludes from tn«
accidental or contingent to a cause, such an inference has
no meaning outside of the phenomenal world, out in the
cosmological proof it is used to transcend experience, which
an an epistemological impossibility. Kant pointed out that
this argument containe a nest of dialectical assumptions*
It may be permissible to assume the existence of God as the
cause of all possible effects, in order to assist reason in
the search for the unity of causes, but to say that such a
being exists necessarily, is an impudent assurance of apodictc
certainty for which there is no basis at all. The uncondi-
tional necessity, which the human reason requires as the
last support of things, is according to Kant the true abyss
of the human reason.
The teleological argument infers the existence of a
Supreme Being from the nature and arrangement of the present
world . But, it too, fails according to Kant* The manifoldnea s,
order and beauty of the world, it tells us, lead us to infer
a cause of its origin and continuance. Such a cause must pos-
sess a higher degree cf perfection than any possibly expe-
rience of ours. What is to prevent us from conceiving all

pos iblfc perfection as united in this Supreme Clusq as in
onn ingle substance? The proof derserves respect; - - it is
the oldest end clearest and most in conformity with the human
reason# It reveals purposes end ends in nature, where our
observation would not itself have detected them# Nevertheless,
one cannot approve to its claims to apodictic certainty. It
is an argument by analogy, inferring from the similarity
between natural products and works of the human art tnat a
similar causality, namely understanding, will, and intelli-
gence lies at the bootom of nature. But an analogy does not
give us any new information bjit those already contained in
the concept we have of it. At oest this argument could
establish the belief in an architect of the world, Out not
in an infinite God. Tde teleological argument leads from
experience to the cosmological proof, which is merely the
disguised ontological proof. Thus the ontological proof would
be the only possible proof if such a proof were possible at
all. But that is impossiole for all synthetic principles of
the understanding are applicable immanently only, and that is
in the realm of the phenomenal reality. But in order to ar-
rive at a knowledge of God me must use them transcendentally,
which is simply impos-,iole.
But the existence of God is necessary for the practical
life. Our volitional nature implies it, and from this practi-
cal necessity, one can postulate the existence of God. As a
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postulate of tne practical reason God hold to the existence
of God. He is the giver of the sumnurn bonurn
,
and distributes
happiness to those who followed tile moral law. It is the
aim of every person to obtain happiness and to be moral; out
both need the existence of God to become complete. Life must
oe an infinite progress toward the highest good, which God
is Himself.
Kant»s treatment of the arguments for God is not wi-
thout defects as has been shown in this thesis; but it has
become the foundation for the modern approach to the argu-
ments for God. The theoretical possibility for any speculative
knowledge of God is denied, -- His existence cannot be demon-
strated scientifically. But the moral law presupposes His
existence 0
1
At the close of his Kritik der praktischen Vernunf
t
Kant expresses his own innermost being in stating:
Zwei Singe erftillen das Gemfit mit immer neuer und
zunehmender Bewunderung und Hhrfurcht; je 6ft er und
anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit besch&ftigt
:
Der bestirnte Himmel tfber mir, und das moralische
Gesetz in mir.
It is the respect for the moral order wiuhin his own
being that caused him to respect the author of the order and
sustainer of the external world.
1 Kant, KpV, 1/4
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